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ABSTRACT

Walala, Micah S. Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2016. A Cross-Sectional and
Mixed-Method Assessment of Safety Culture and Safety Climate at a Regional
Airline. Major Professor: Richard Fanjoy.

The researcher applied a mixed methods approach to conduct a cross-sectional
assessment of the safety culture, safety climate, and SMS at a regional airline in
the United States. Data collection techniques were comprised of interview,
online-survey, and a focus group activity. Participants in the current study were
maintenance technicians, flight attendants, dispatchers, pilots, and managers.
Results indicated significant differences of perception of safety climate, safety
culture, and Safety Management System between the maintenance technicians
and flight attendants. The length of time a participant had worked at the subject
airline and age of the participant appeared to be significant factors of perception
of safety climate. The ASAP safety program appeared to be the most positively
perceived safety program across all the studied groups. Participants expressed a
general positive outlook of safety at the subject airline. Elements of concern
highlighted included routine violation and senior management being out of touch
with frontline employees. The researcher presents recommendations for practice
and future research.

xiv
Keywords: Safety Culture, Safety Management System, Safety climate,
Perceptions
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study was to assess the safety climate and safety
culture at a regional airline in the United States (U.S). Employee perception of
the subject airline’s safety climate, as well as that of the five elements of a
positive safety culture (Reason, 1997) were assessed. Elements of safety climate
assessed in the current study are three of the most identified by researchers
(Dedobbeleer & Béland, 1991; Flint et al., 2000; Patankar et al., 2012; Seo et al.,
2004; Zohar, 2000). Additionally, the employee perception of the four pillars of
Safety Management System (SMS) (International Civil Aviation Organization
[ICAO], 2013), were evaluated. Participants of the study were front-line
employees and management of the subject airlines. The two groups are critical to
airline operational safety (Taylor, 2012). The front-line participants were from the
groups Pilots, Flight attendant, Dispatch, and Maintenance. This study used a
mixed-method (Creswell, 2009) approach as well as a cross-sectional design
(Wreathall, 1995).
Safety is an integral element of the aviation industry. Like many industries,
the aviation industry has inherent risks that need to be regularly identified and
managed to improve operational safety. Identifying risk is among the key steps to
managing risk. Lack of clarity in the process by which risks are identified and
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interpreted can hamper efforts to monitor and improve safety. In addition, a
robust safety system is essential to the effective management of safety (Macrae,
2009).The historical method of assessing safety has been primarily through
observing and measuring the rate of accidents and/or incidents (Liou et al., 2008).
Gerede (2014) considers this approach objective and practical, but also ‘reactive’
(p. 1) as safety is assessed after occurrences of unsafe events. Nevertheless, it
is no longer logical to manage safety reactively due to relatively lower rate of
accidents (Liou et al., 2008; Wood, 2003). Additionally, the traditional approach
to management of safety fails to adequately address other diverse operational
safety elements. Liou et al. (2008) identified other aspects of safety as such as
human and organizational factors; operators; aviation regulators; aviation service
providers; and organizational culture. These factors may contribute to latent
unsafe conditions that might be difficult to forecast using historical safety
assessment practices (Liou et al., 2008).
The Safety Management System (SMS) is a performance-based and riskbased approach to managing safety. SMS addresses some of the deficiencies
inherent in the historical style of evaluating safety performance by taking a topdown approach and robust commitment to safety in an organization (Lewis,
2008). SMS functions on the premise that safety is achieved by cultivating a
positive safety culture that runs through all levels of an organization (Chen &
Chen, 2011; Gill & Shergill, 2004; Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). Culture
influences perceptions of safety programs. Actions and behaviors of individuals,
organizations, and societies are dictated by the perceptions they have
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concerning decisions they have to make (International Aviation Transport
Association [IATA], 2011; Lewis, 2008).
Positive safety culture is characterized by elements such as learning,
reporting, informed, flexible, and just cultures (International Association of Oil &
Gas Producers, 2013; Reason, 1997). Of these, reporting culture is integral to a
proactive and predictive safety initiative as it facilitates the availability of data.
Data is critical to identify latent failures that can be mitigated to improve safety.
Then again, reporting culture is dependent upon a sound just culture. A just
culture is one in which trust thrives that encourages members of an organization
or community to provide information about safety incidents without fear of unjust
persecution. It provides a blame-free atmosphere conducive for genuine dialogue
and room to learn from safety related reporting.
Assessing employee perceptions towards an organization’s safety practices,
policies, and procedures can best reflect an individual’s likely intentions and
behavior (Gerede, 2014; Taylor, 2012). Intentions and behavior may include
safety reporting and adherence to established policies, practice, and procedures.
The collective perceptions of components of a safety system can be useful to
predict organizational trends in attitudes towards safety. The trends can identify
areas of an organization that have a strong safety standing as well as areas that
require a stronger emphasis on safety. Evaluation of an organization’s safety
culture is particularly important in high-reliability organizations such as energy
and aviation that have low rates of accidents and incidents (Gerede, 2014).
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The effectiveness of SMS has led to the program being mandated in some
industries. ICAO requires international carriers and international airports to have
SMS in place (Maurino, 2007). Other sectors of aviation, such as domestic
airports and general aviation (GA) that include flight training, are also
encouraged to implement SMS (May, 2010).
The development and continual reevaluation of SMS policies, procedures,
and actions is vital to an effective safety risk management program (Gerede,
2014). Efforts towards establishing a vigorous SMS are partially based on
feedback from employees and other relevant stakeholders (Chen & Chen, 2011;
Gill & Shergill, 2004). This study addresses research questions by evaluating
employee perceptions of the subject organization’s safety policies, procedures,
and practices.

1.1

Significance

Similar to other high-reliability organizations such as the healthcare and
energy sectors, the aviation industry is employing SMS as a predictive and
comprehensive approach to managing safety (Stolzer et. al., 2008). The core
success variable of a robust safety program is how well the safety program is
established and sustained in a positive safety culture (IATA, 2011; Lewis, 2008).
Understanding perceptions of safety culture is an important gap-analysis step in
an organization’s efforts to create and re-evaluate an effective SMS (Stolzer et al.
2008). Liou et al. (2008) underscore the importance front-line employee’s role in
an organization’s safety. This study proposed to provide an in-depth overview of
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front-line employee understanding and perceptions of safety policies, procedures,
and practices. Organizational culture can be dynamic (Reason, 1998; Stolzer et
al. 2008; Taylor, 2012). It is imperative that organizations assess their safety
culture regularly as part of their on-going effort to safety strategic planning and
management.
This study reflects with ICAO’s standard and recommended practices and
FAA’s guidelines. The two institutions challenge the aviation community to
persistently evaluate and cultivate a positive operational safety culture. A
dynamic positive safety culture is essential in matching the dynamic nature of the
aviation industry in areas such as technology and environment. The guidelines
also include the adoption of SMS (ICAO, 2009).

1.2

Statement of Purpose

The purpose of this study was to evaluate safety culture at a regional
airline by assessing employee understanding and perceptions of their current
organization’s safety policies, procedures, and practices. Participants were frontline employees and managers. Front-line employees included pilots, dispatchers,
flight attendants, and maintenance technicians. In addition, the current research
aimed to investigate whether there were any statistically-significant differences in
safety culture perceptions across the front-line employee groups and between
the front-line employee groups and managers.
This study was conducted in three phases. The first two phases were survey
and interview. These phases were intended to identify participants’ general
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perceptions of the subject airline’s safety culture, safety climate, and SMS. The
results from the first two phases of the study formed the building block for the
third phase, focus groups. The purpose of the focus group was to gain in-depth
understanding of common themes and concerns identified by the first two phases
of the study.
Understanding of organization safety perception has potential to further
improve an organization’s safety risk management. Significant differences in
organization safety culture perception between the managers and front-line
employees may elicit further investigation for purposes of improving safety.
Likewise, differences of perceptions across the studied groups of front-line
employees may suggest latent variables of safety, whether positive or negative.
The variables may be explored further to reinforce safety risk management in the
organization. Results from the current study have potential to assist in SMS
implementation and reevaluation efforts (Cheng & Cheng, 2011).

1.3

Research Question

The purpose of this research was to evaluate perceptions of safety culture
and safety climate at a regional airline by answering the following questions:
1. What are employee perceptions of the safety climate at the subject airline
among and across the target study groups: pilots, maintenance
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the
subject airline?
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Ho: Perceptions of the safety climate at the subject airline are positive and
seamless across all the studied groups: pilots, maintenance
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the
subject airline.
Ha: Significant variations exist regarding safety climate across the studied
groups in the subject airline.
2. What are employee perceptions of the four SMS pillars at the subject
airline, among and across the target study groups: pilots, maintenance
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the
subject airline?
Ho: Perceptions of the four pillars of SMS at the subject airline are positive
and seamless across all the studied groups: pilots, maintenance
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the
subject airline.
Ha: Significant variations exist regarding the four pillars of SMS across the
studied groups in the subject airline.

3. What are employee perceptions of the safety culture at the subject airline
among and across the target study groups: pilots, maintenance
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the
subject airline?
Ho: Perceptions of the safety culture at the subject airline are positive and
seamless among and across all the studied groups: pilots,
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maintenance technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the
management of the subject airline
Ha: Significant variations exist regarding safety culture among and across
the studied groups in the subject airline
Ha: Significant variations exist regarding safety culture among the studied
groups in the subject airline
4. Are demographic elements such as age, gender, and length of
employment, significant variables of perception of safety climate and/or
safety culture at the subject airline?
Ho Demographic elements such as gender and age are not significant
variables of safety climate and/or safety culture at the subject airline.
Ha: Demographic elements such as gender and age are significant
variables of safety climate and/or safety culture at the subject airline

1.4

Assumptions

The study made the following assumptions:
1. Participants were honest with all their responses.
2. All respondents were employees of the subject airline during the study
period.
3. Participants participated without any undue negative influence.
4. All employees had access to the subject airline’s Intranet, and to
information pertaining to the current study.

9
5. All employees have access to, and read the subject airline’s monthly
safety newsletter.
6. All participants made a single complete attempt on the online survey

1.5

Limitations

This study had the following limitations:
1. Two of the three phases of the study, interview and focus group activities,
were limited to participants of a single operational location.
2. The survey study was limited by the number of complete responses.
3. Participants of the survey phase of the study may not have been a truly
random sample.
4. The current study limited evaluated safety climate perceptions to three

1.6

Delimitations

The delimitations of the study were:
1. The study sample was limited to front-line employees: pilots, maintenance
technicians, flight attendants, and dispatchers, as well as managers.
2. The study limited participants to the then-current employees of the subject
airline.
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1.7

Definition of Key Terms

Accident – “Any unplanned act or event that results in damage to property,
material, equipment, cargo, or personal injury or death when not the result
of enemy action” (Ericson, 2005, p. 14).
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) – an agency that regulates civil aviation in
United States (Taylor, 2012)
Hazard – “A hazard is a condition that could foreseeably cause or contribute to
an accident” (DOT, 2012, p. 8).
High Reliability Organization – are organizations that “operate in hazardous, fastpaced, and complex environments yet avoid catastrophic accidents.” (Tolk,
Cantu, & Beruvides, 2015, p. 218).
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) – an agency of the United
Nations responsible for standardized development of civil aviation to its
member States worldwide, and for promoting aviation safety.
Mishap – “An unplanned event or series of events resulting in death, injury,
occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or
damage to the environment” (DOD, 2000, p. 6)
Occurrence – “…is [a] tracking system for call-offs when a pilot or flight attendant
misses work” (“deleted” [study subject airline liaison], March 18, 2016)
Risk – “...an expression of the future impact of an undesired event in terms of
event severity and event likelihood” (FAA, n.d., para. 2)
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Safety – is “…the state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property
damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level
through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety risk
management” (ICAO, 2013, p. 2-1).

1.8

Summary

This chapter outlined the background of the study and highlighted the
study’s significance, purpose, and assumptions. The chapter also addressed
research questions, limitations, and delimitations of the study. The next chapter
discusses the literature related to this study.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of aviation safety culture and
aviation safety management, and addresses the concept of a safety
management system (SMS). In addition, the chapter outlines the role of SMS in
aviation safety culture and aviation safety in general. The role of aviation safety
perceptions as an indicator of safety behavior and organizational safety status is
discussed. The chapter also revisits previously related studies as well as
discusses theories and approaches related to safety.

2.1

Safety, Risk, and Hazard

Scholars, as well as the type of discipline or industry have differed
regarding the definition of safety. Hudson (2001b) took a conventional
understanding of safety as “Thou shall not harm” (p. 8.1). Ericson (2005) views
safety as the process of “identification of hazards, assessment of hazard mishap
risk, and the control of hazards presenting acceptable risks” (p. 14). ICAO’s
(2013) position on safety is “… the state at which the risk of harm to persons or
of property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable
level through a continuing process of hazard identification and risk management”
(p. 1-1). This study focused on the ICAO (2013) definition of safety. It recognizes
the need to eliminate, minimize, or mitigate hazards and/or associated risks. The
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definition also acknowledges that aspects of hazards and risk are dynamic, and
so should be the efforts towards managing safety.
The process of risk management starts by establishing a standardized
approach of identifying potential hazards. The Department of Transportation
(DOT), defines a hazard as “…a condition that could foreseeably cause or
contribute to an accident” (DOT, 2012, p. 8). A hazard becomes a risk when it is
no longer contained. This study defines risk as “...an expression of the future
impact of an undesired event in terms of event severity and event likelihood”
(FAA, n.d., para. 2).
Stolzer, Halford, and Goglia, (2011) referred to the total risk an
organization is subjected to as enterprise risk. Enterprise risk management (ERM)
is composed of risks such as strategic, financial, compliance, and corporate
image risks. Others are environmental, project, and operational risk. This study
focused on operational risk, a risk associated with elements such as assets,
people, and technology. This study will be focusing specifically on human
perceptions. To manage safety, the mentioned aspects of safety have to be
identified and measured.

2.2

Identification and Measurement of Safety

Vick (2002) described safety as a concept and construct, hence subjective
and immeasurable. Subsequently, Rose (2006) suggested ascertaining safety in
some form that allows it to be quantified and more accurately measured.
Assessing risk provides a building block to quantify and measure safety. Yet, like

14
safety, risk can be subjective in many variables such as individuals, type of
discipline, nature of an organization, and individual experiences (Adjekum, et al.,
2015; Taylor, 2012). Risks in high-reliability organizations such as petroleum and
nuclear industries may lead to catastrophic results to include loss of life, injury,
and destruction of property. On the other hand, risks in non-high-reliability
organizations such as commercial and social institutions may often result in
minimal injury to life and property. It is therefore imperative that industries and
organizations define and standardize their approach to hazard analysis and risk
management.
In 2011, Stolzer et al. outlined five steps of a hazard-management process
as identifying risk; measuring and assessing of the amount and nature of
exposures; reducing the magnitude and length of exposure, transferring or
elimination exposure; reporting the identified risk; and accepting risk. However,
hazards have to first be perceived or identified. The process of hazard
identification addresses considerations such as who, what, where, when, and
why events occurred (Stolzer et al., 2011). These considerations permit for a
more exhaustive assessment of hazards and their effects. Risk analysis
appraises the likelihood of an event occurring against the severity of the effects
of the event (FAA, n.d.). The values, likelihood (as depicted in Table 1) and
severity, (as depicted in Table 2) of the risks under consideration are defined by
individual industries and organizations.
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Table 1 Categorization of the Likelihood of Occurrence of a Risk
Individual
Frequent
Fleet
Individual
Probable
Fleet
Individual
Occasional
Fleet
Individual
Remote
Fleet
Individual
Improbable
Fleet

Likelihood Scale Definitions
Likely to occur often
Continuously experienced
Will occur several times
Will occur often
Likely to occur some time.
Will occur several times
Unlikely to occur, but possible
Unlikely to occur but can be reasonably expected to occur
So unlikely, it can be assumed it will not occur
Unlikely to occur, but possible

Note. Adopted from “System safety processes,” by FAA, n.d., Retrieved from
https://www.faasafety.gov/gslac/alc/libview_normal.aspx?id=6877

Table 2 Categorization of Severity Scale
Severity Scale Definitions
Catastrophic Results in fatalities and/or loss of the system
Critical
Severe injury and/or major system damage
Marginal
Minor injury and/or minor system damage
Negligible
Less than minor injury and/or less than minor system damage
Note. Adopted from “System safety processes,” by FAA, n.d., Retrieved from
https://www.faasafety.gov/gslac/alc/libview_normal.aspx?id=6877

A desirable safety status is one with the lowest probability of occurrence of
risk and the lowest severity of risk. Risk assessment is performed after risk
analysis. Risk assessment combines the elements of risk analysis and weighs
them against a standardized, acceptable criteria. A risk assessment model is
presented in the form of a risk assessment matrix as demonstrated by Table 3. A
risk matrix can be used as a tool to measure risk, guide mitigation factors, and for
general safety management.
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Table 3 Risk Assessment Matrix

Note. Adopted from “System safety processes,” by FAA, n.d., Retrieved from
https://www.faasafety.gov/gslac/alc/libview_normal.aspx?id=6877

While hazard identification is key to risk management and mitigation,
Ericson (2005) asserted that some hazards are more discernible than others. A
foreign object on the runway is a case in point for an obvious operational flight
hazard. On the other hand, poor organizational safety culture may pose hazards
to operational safety, hazards that may be considerably less apparent compared
to the case of a foreign object on the runway. Sound safety management
programs and techniques should be able to discern such latent safety hazards.
Equally, the techniques ought to be dynamic, to reflect the evolving safety
considerations such as technology and human behavior (Ericson, 2005).
Increasingly, focus on safety is shifting towards organizational and
environmental challenges (Liou et al., 2008; Taylor, 2012). This paradigm calls
for a dynamic review of the approach that hazards are identified and risk
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assessed and managed. An ideal model for safety analysis system is one that
captures both traditionally engineering factors of safety as well as the emerging
human and organizational variables of safety. Understanding of the
metamorphosis of approaches to evaluation of safety can provide a clear
indication of the dynamism of safety variables and the direction the aviation
industry needs to embrace going forward.

2.2.1 Historical Approach to Evaluating Safety
Over time, efforts to improve safety through accidental-causation analysis
has transitioned through three main phases as depicted by figure 1 (FAA, 2015).
Ericson (2005) identifies the two main groups of safety variables as engineering
design and organizational factors. The earlier years of aviation saw accidents
and incidents largely caused by inadequate engineering designs (Ericson, 2005;
FAA, 2015). Subsequently, safety and operational risk were evaluated mainly
based on the frequency of accidents and incidents (Liou et al., 2008). Gibbons,
von Thaden, and Wiegmann (2006) refer to accidents and incidents as ‘lagging’
indicators of safety as they provide clarity of the status of safety after incidents
and/or accidents. This “fly-crash-fix’ (Stolzer et al., 2008, p. 13) approach to
managing safety is reactive-based and provides minimal opportunity for proactive
analysis and mitigation regarding safety practices (Gerede, 2014). Rose (2006)
points out that the historical method of evaluating safety can still be applied in
situations that experience high frequency of incidents and accidents.
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Figure 1. Evolution of the approach to safety.
Adapted from “Safety Management System SMS explained” by FAA, 2015

Since the 1930s and 1940s, improved engineering design and technology
continue to eliminate or minimize many of the earlier hazardous design flaws
(FAA, 2015). Mechanically induced accidents declined during this period.
However, accidents rates were still significantly high. The ever-increasing
complexities of emerging technologies presented new challenges to human and
organizational capabilities. These challenges were very evident during the 1950s
to 70s era. Attention turned to human factors issues due to an increase in
human-error related accidents and incidents. Human factors efforts concentrated
on how individuals and crews performed together, as well as with their working
environment. Programs such as Crew Resource Management and Maintenance
Resource Management (MRM) were introduced to address human-related safety
issues. These efforts further improved the industry’s safety. Gradually however,
additional analysis of accidents and incidents indicated a series of opportunities
that if observed, would have prevented more unsafe occurrences. These
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accidents were determined to be related to organizational decisions and attitudes
(FAA, 2015).
In the late 70’s, management of safety started to take a more proactive
viewpoint. The aviation industry started to collect and analyze more safety
related data to learn, project, and mitigate recurring poor safety practices. The
rates of aviation accidents and incidents have continued to decline since.
However, Liou at al. (2008) note low accident and incident frequencies do not
necessarily equate to a high safety standards. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), ICAO, and other stakeholders in the aviation safety such
as operators and airport managers recognize the need to continually improve
aviation safety to address all modern concerns (ICAO, 2009).
2.2.2 Modern Approach to Evaluating Safety
Traditionally, the aviation industry has taken a reactive approach to
identifying hazards (Stolzer et al., 2008). As aviation safety improved with the
advancement of science and technology, the industry acknowledged the need to
be proactive in the industry’s safety. In the proactive method, the industry actively
seeks to identify hazardous conditions through analysis of the organizational
processes (FAA, 2015). A proactive method relies heavily on data-analysis to
identify potential hazards. Appropriate mitigation factors are then put in place to
promote safer practices. While this method, currently in place, has had a
significantly positive impact on aviation safety, the industry is always in need to
devise newer and more effective ways to improve safety (ICAO, 2009). A
predictive approach to safety is one such newer approach (FAA, 2015).
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A predictive approach to safety analyzes system processes and the
environment to identify potential unsafe acts. SMS embodies the predictive
approach (FAA, 2015). SMS underscores the importance of attitude and the
environment, specifically, organizational processes (U.S. Government
Accountability Office [GAO], 2014; Stolzer et al. 2008). SMS calls for in-depth
knowledge of “hazard identification, risk management, system theory, human
factors engineering, organizational culture, quality engineering and management,
quantitative methods, and decision theory” (Stolzer et al. 2008).
The modern technique of safety and risk management is shifting towards a
heavily data-driven and risk-based practice (GAO, 2014). ICAO and the FAA are
championing this approach, enshrined in a safety management architecture
known as Safety Management System (SMS), to aviation communities worldwide
(ICAO, 2009). SMS focuses on developing an organizational safety culture that
enhances safety. Unlike historical methods, of managing safety that were more
dependent on ‘lagging’ safety indicators, modern methods focus on identifying
and managing latent safety variables (GAO, 2014).
Effective management of safety requires sound policies, procedures, and
practices. Equally important is the behavior of employees regarding the
stipulated policies, procedures, and practices. While it may be difficult to
measure behavior, Taylor (2012) suggests that evaluating employee beliefs
provides a good indicator of their likely behavior. Taylor proposes links between
beliefs, espoused values, attitudes, artifacts, and behavior. Values are shaped by
belief and determine behavior. Understanding beliefs and values as well as
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organizational culture may serve as a clearer indicator of likely behavior. Belief
and values that do not align with positive safety behavior may indicate ‘leading’
(Yule, 2003) safety indicators and provoke investigation into possible mitigation
measures (Taylor, 2012). The ‘leading’ safety indicators allow for evaluation of
hazards before occurrences of accidents and/or incidents, in essence, a
predictive safety approach (Yule, 2003).
To ensure a robust safety management program, understanding of the
organizational and other human factors variables becomes very vital – perhaps
as important as understanding the performance of the mechanical and
engineering aspects of as system. There is need for a robust data acquisition,
management, and processing architecture that captures both engineeringcentered as well as human factors-centered data. Effective data acquisition
requires pertinent and vigorous safety reporting systems.

2.3

Safety Reporting Systems

Scholars including Liou et al. (2008) have demonstrated the significance of
safety reporting systems in an organization. SMS and other modern safety
programs rely significantly on data. Data has to be efficiently acquired, recorded,
and properly processed to identify potential hazardous patterns. The hazards can
then be remedied accordingly. Aspects such as ease of use, availability, and
accessibility are important to a data reporting and data management system.
Data capturing systems should also be valid, readily available, and reliable (Liou
et al., 2008).
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The GAIN Working Group (2004) cites legal and insurance variables as
motivators for mandatory safety reporting by organizations. A major limitation of
safety reporting is the tendency of humans to limit full disclosure for fear of blame
or incrimination. Consequently, a significant number of incidents may go
completely unreported, which may hamper efforts to improve safety. Other
constraints of reporting culture include distrust of the system’s confidentiality, and
the workload related to reporting. Nevertheless, factors that motivate employees
to report, such as perceived benefit, can improve safety reporting. Automatic
logging systems and other engineering measures are possible ways to mitigate
human reporting limitations. However, engineering solutions can often be difficult
to implement in existing systems (The GAIN Working Group, 2004).
Stolzer et al. (2011) identifies four main streams from which data is
acquired during operational risk management as auditing, investigations, people
reports, and data. Audit describes data that is captured by independent teams
while conducting on-site visits. An ‘audit’ can be internal, performed by the
organization’s own staff, or external, performed by an entity that is not part of the
organization under review. ‘Investigations’ defines an assessment that takes
place following incidents or/and accidents. The data method uses an engineering
solution such as the operational flight data monitoring system (FDM), also known
as flight operations quality assurance (FOQA) (Landry, 2012). People reports
concerns data generated manually by personnel, such as through the suggestion
box, or through telephone call. A pilot report or anonymous hotline are good
examples of people reports (Stolzer et al., 2011).
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2.3.1 Voluntary data recording streams
Flight Operations Quality Assurance - FOQA
FOQA is a data management system that records electronic flight
parameters and aircraft systems status. Parameters, such as flight manual
limitations, are subsequently analyzed for significant anomalies to help identify
potential high-risk trends. According to the FAA (2014), FOQA is a voluntary and
anonymous program that captures broad operational data to identify hazardous
patterns such as systematic deviations from flight protocol. A significant
reduction of accidents to a rate lower than the current is projected should this
program be used properly. The key for the success of the program is the
objectivity of the data captured as well as “application of corrective actions and
follow-up” (para. 2). Due to its effectiveness, the FAA is engaging aviation
communities across the world to promote the use of the program (FAA, 2014).
Mitchell, Sholy, and Stolzer (2007) propose the adoption of the FOQA
program in the General Aviation (GA) sector. In addition to improving operational
performance and safety, other areas of potential benefit include training and
maintenance services. A major hindrance to the adoption of FOQA program in
GA has been the high cost developing and certifying the program. A FOQA
program for GA use (FOQA-GA) is one feasible solution to managing the cost
variable. FOQA-GA is a “less sophisticated” and “autonomous system that is
independent of the aircraft platform” (p. 2) but functions in much similar way to
the standard FOQA programs common with major carriers and at a much lower
cost (Mitchell, Sholy, & Stolzer, 2007).
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An advantage of an engineering solutions like the FOQA program are their
ability to transfer data automatically and in real-time. In addition to higher speeds
and efficiency, automatically transmitted data overcome some of the limitations of
human-data transmission methods such as non-reporting and false or partial
reporting. Humans can report inadequately for a number of reasons including
fear of being reprimanded and inadequate motivation to report. The accuracy of
reported data is important in safety management because the effectiveness of
safety promotion and mitigation factors presume a higher degree of accuracy of
the data used. Another method of capturing date is through people reports,
usually in the form of voluntary safety reporting systems (Stolzer, 2011).
Aviation Safety Reporting System – ASRS
People reports voluntary reporting systems allow users to report incidents
anonymously. The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is the most
common voluntary safety reporting system in the U.S. (National Aeronautics and
Space Administration [NASA], 2015). ASRS is funded by the FAA and managed
NASA to safeguard anonymity of those who report safety incidents. ASRS
provides a platform for personnel such as pilots, aircraft technicians, and air
traffic controllers to report incidents or hazardous situations. Data can be
recorded through an online electronic platform or recorded manually then mailed
by surface means. Recorded data include air traffic communications, near midair
collisions (NMAC), airport safety conditions or services, and maintenance
practices.
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According to NASA (2015), the ASRS program covers operations in flight
segments such as en-route, departure, and landing. ASRS assures anonymity
and immunity from punitive action to reporters if incidents are reported within 10
days of occurrence. Submitted data is stripped of all identifiable information such
as the reporter and the institution names to ensure anonymity. Exceptions to
legal immunity include committal of criminal offense and accidents, as well as
having a prior Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) violation within the past five
years of reporting. Processed reports are made available to the aviation
community for the purpose of improving aviation safety (NASA, 2015).
Aviation Safety Action Plan – ASAP.
A product of the FAA’s (2002) Advisory Circular AC No: 120-66B, ASAP
closely mirrors ASRS. ASAP encourages employees of participating airlines and
certified repair station to voluntarily “report safety information that may be critical
to identifying potential precursors to accidents without fear of disciplinary action”
from the employer or the FAA (p. 1). Pilots, maintenance technician, flight
attendants, and dispatchers are all encouraged to participate. Incidents have to
be reported within 24 hours of occurrence. Other exceptions to immunity include
deliberate violations of safety, criminal activity and falsification. A Safety Event
Review Committee (ERC) usually comprised of representatives from the FAA,
employee union, and employer, review all reports and have to reach a consensus
or corrective action. The corrective action may include remedial training, which
does not show up in the employee’s records. In the cases where the FAA has
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knowledge outside the ASAP reports, administrative actions include an FAA
Warning Notice and FAA Letter of Correction (FAA, 2002).
Other anonymous and non-punitive safety reporting agencies include the
Air Traffic Organization (ATO). ATO is the operational sector of the FAA that
provides air navigation services in the U.S. ATO maintains its own Voluntary
Safety Reporting Program (VSRP) (FAA, 2014).
The foundation of a non-punitive self-reporting system is built on the
principle of trust (Hudson, 2001b; NASA, 2015). When reporting incidents,
employees have to believe that their anonymity will be guaranteed and there will
be no punitive measures toward them as a result. Perceived lack of trust and just
culture can lead to lower frequency of incident reporting. The FAA (2008)
identifies reporting culture as another characteristic of a good safety reporting
system. An organization needs to nurture a reporting culture, which enhances the
willingness of employees to report incidents and accidents. Additionally, a just
culture encourages positive employee reporting behavior. Employees feel that
they will be treated fairly upon reporting, yet still be held accountable for their
roles. It is also important to have bottom-up communication concerning safety
issues to enable management to constantly and effectively reevaluate safety
policy. Safety feedback is especially important to front-line employees. An
employee may feel listened to and encouraged towards a positive safety attitude
and behavior such as safety reporting if they receive positive feedback on
reported incidents. Safety promotion and communication reflects organizational
efforts towards the promotion of safety programs.
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Lower frequency of reported safety concerns may not necessarily equate
to safer operations (Liou et al., 2008). Since safety evaluation and management
increasingly rely on data (ICAO, 2009; Rose, 2006), the level at which safety
culture is perceived to permeate an organization can affect self-reporting
behavior. This underscores the need for organizations to constantly reevaluate
their safety culture and climate. Other determinants of employee self-reporting
include knowledge of hazards, knowledge of a hazard reporting system, and
accessibility to a hazard reporting system (Adjekum et al., 2015; Hudson, 2001b).
The reliability and verifiability of data captured is important as the accuracy and
mitigation measures are largely based on the data. Efforts to apply analyzed data
and investigate incidents as well as accidents are guided by scientific techniques
as a set of theories.

2.4

Accident Assessment Tools and Theories

Heinrich’s Law
Heinrich (1959) performed an elaborate examination of accidents and
incidents reports in 1930s. Results from the study suggested that for every
serious injury event, there had been approximately 29 accidents with minor
injuries, and 330 accidents with no injuries, a ratio of 1:29:330 respectively.
Reasoning that because many accidents have common root causes, Heinrich
theorized that mitigating the more prone accidents that had no injuries would, in
retrospect, eliminate or reduce likelihood of injury-accidents. Bird and Germain
(1969) later analyzed 1,753,498 accidents that had occurred in 279 companies.
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The researchers established a new ratio for accident projection, 1:10:30:600. The
ratio corresponded to one serious injury accident, for every 10 minor injuries, 30
accidents resulting in property damage, and 600 incidents with no visible injuries
or damage (see figure 2).

Figure 2. Bird and Germain’s Safety triangle.
Adapted from “Safety management manual” by ICAO, 2009

Comparatively, the U.S. commercial airlines sector of air transport averages
about 50 accidents per year (Stolzer et al., 2008). Of these, two are categorized
as ‘major’, three as ‘serious’, 25 ‘with injury’, and 25 ‘with damage’.
Heinrich’s Law (Heinrich, 1959) and Bird and Germain’s safety triangle
(ICAO, 2006) suggest that whereas it is challenging to reduce safety risk to zero,
there are opportunities for the aviation industry to be more proactive in managing
safety (Bird & Germain, 1969; Stolzer et al., 2008). However, Heinrich’s Law has
come under considerable criticism. Manuele (2013) asserts that the Law
assumes two myths:
a. Unsafe acts of workers are the principal causes of occupational
accidents.
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b. Reducing incident frequency will achieve an equivalent
reduction in injury severity (p. 4).
Manuele’s (2013) study indicated effectiveness in reducing frequency in smaller
injury-free accidents. However, there was no positive bearing, or in some cases,
there was negative bearing on the more severe incidents. The researcher
suggests an effective and unbiased reporting of incidents is vital for safety and
accidents analysis. Only then can a thorough investigation to identify latent
unsafe practices take place (Manuele, 2013).
Manuele’s (2013) observations mirror the current aviation industry’s
viewpoint that is shifting its emphasis from focusing mostly on events
represented by the peak of the safety triangle, to the base (Liou, 2008; Reason,
1990, 1997; Taylor 2012). More so, the shift is also targeting elements of safety
such as organizational culture, to develop and foster a more positive safety
culture. Reason’s (1997) Swiss Cheese model further expands the safety triangle
by underscoring the need to focus on safety reporting in order to improve the
chances of discovering latent unsafe conditions.
The Swiss Cheese model of human error
In 1990, Reason proposed a model of the causation of human error that
was later known as the ‘Swiss – Cheese’ model. In the model, four slices of the
Swiss cheese lined up side by side, represent the four levels of safety defenses.
The levels are Organizational Influences, Unsafe Supervision, Preconditions for
Unsafe Acts, and Unsafe Acts, in descending order of hierarchy. These defenses
have mutable holes in them that may emerge, close up, and change in sizes. An
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accident or incident occurs when a straight line can go through all the four slices
or stages of a system’s defense (Reason, 1990).
Reason (1997) points out Unsafe Acts as the most important layer of safety
as it is the last line of operational defense. According to Shappell and Wiegmann
(2000), the aviation industry often refers to the Unsafe Acts stage of system
defense during accident investigation as pilot or human error. Reason (1990)
denotes that Unsafe Acts receive the most attention during an investigation
following an accident or incident. It is the action or inaction of a crew that results
in an accident. Preconditions for Unsafe Acts describes prevailing variables, for
example, fatigue and poor crew coordination that lead to poor decision-making.
The decisions are wrong actions or inactions that may lead to an accident or
incident. For example, a pilot may continue flight into weather minimums beyond
their skills or training due to organizational pressure to arrive on time.
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts are attributed to poor or inadequate supervision,
otherwise known by the model as Unsafe Supervision. The general manner in
which an organization carries out its practices ranging from budgeting, human
resource management, and culture influences safety variables including
supervision. This highest stage of safety defense is referred to as Organizational
Influences (Reason, 2009).
An advantage inherent in the Swiss Cheese model is its thoroughness to
investigate beyond the actions and inactions that ultimately result in an accident
or incident. The model allows for identification and mitigation of latent failures
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and weakness in the system’s safety beyond the unsafe acts layer. It investigates
root course of accidents in an entire system.
Grady (2014, para. 5) defined a system as a composition of “entities that
work together through relationships and with their environment”. Systems have
an inherent ability to fail (Ericson, 2005). A system fails when it does not meet its
expected requirements. Successful breaches in all layers of safety result in
failures, which increase mishap risks such as injury, damage, and death. The
Swiss-Cheese model conceptualizes accidents as a result of “successive
breaches in multiple system defense” (ICAO, 2013, p. 2-3).
ICAO (2013) categorizes failures into two groups:


Active failures – “…actions or inactions, including errors and
violations, which have an immediate adverse effect” (p. 2-3).



Latent conditions – “…are those that exist in the aviation system well
before a damaging outcome is experienced” (p. 2-3).

Active failures are largely associated with front-line employees and are closely
related to unsafe acts. Latent conditions may remain dormant for a long time,
may fail to be viewed as harmful, and can eventually lead to accidents. Latent
conditions frequently result from lack of positive safety culture, conflicting
organizational goals, inferior equipment, procedural design, and faulty
organizational structures or poor decision-making by the management (ICAO,
2013).
Ultimately, a desirable system is one with benefits such as high productivity,
and low mishap risk. The tradeoff between hazard and benefit is critical,

32
especially in high-reliability organizations. Individual industries determine their
own balance of risk and benefit. This balance defines an organization’s safety
margins and safety risk management. The Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System is a safety analysis program that focuses and elaborates
further on latent failures.
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)
In 2002, Shappell and Wiegmann further developed Reason’s (1990) Swiss
Cheese model to elaborate more on the four levels of safety nets; Organizational
Influences, Unsafe Supervision, Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, and Unsafe Acts.
The researchers referred to the resultant accident and incident analysis tool as
the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). Unsafe Acts
can be in the form of Errors or Violations (Reason, 1990). Reason (1990) defines
errors as efforts that achieve unintended results and violations as intentional
actions or inactions designed to cause a negative outcome.
Shappell and Wiegmann (2002) sub-categorized errors as either Decision
errors, referring to poor decision making such as responding wrongly to an
emergency and Skilled-Based error such as applying poor technique to a flight
maneuver. A third, Perception error, may include visual illusion that results in, for
example, controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). Violations describe a blatant
disregard for established rules and guidelines. Flying an unauthorized approach
and failing to adhere to training rules are examples of violations. Violations are
either Routine, occurring frequently in the organization or Exceptional, occurring
seldom. Routine violations such as habitual speeding on taxiway by a fleet may
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indicate a flaw in the organizational safety culture. Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
include Substandard Conditions of Operations and Substandard Practices of
Operator. The former category includes an Adverse Mental State such as
complacency, Adverse Psychological State including mental illness, and a
Physical/Mental Limitation that allows unsafe operational conditions such as
visual limitation. The subcategory Substandard Practices of Operators is
comprised of two subcategories, Crew Resource Management (CRM) and
Personal Readiness. The CRM component entails coordination among personnel
including good communication that extends to before and after a flight activity.
Personnel Readiness describes mental and physical preparation for work, for
example, getting sufficient rest to effectively focus on work (Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2002).
Regarding the Unsafe Supervision layer, Shappell and Wiegmann (2002)
designed four subcategories. Inadequate Supervision involves the ability of a
supervisor to provide necessary motivation and guidance to an employee.
Another, Planned Inappropriate Operations describes the level of preparation
that goes into planning an operation such as allowing for adequate planning time.
Failure to Correct a Known Problem and Supervisory violations concern blatant
disregard for rules and regulations. Organizational Influences, the first layer of
safety net, includes Resource Management, Organizational Climate, and
Organizational Process subcategories. Resource Management is focused on
management’s decision-making process regarding allocation of resources such
as personnel and finances. An organization will allocate resources in areas it
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values most. Safety needs have to be accorded matching priority in resource
allocations. Researchers defined Organization Climate as “…broad class of
organizational variables that influence worker performance” (p. 11). Also known
as the ‘working environment’, climate includes variables such as structures,
policies, and culture that define how an organization operates. Organizational
Process involves procedures and oversight of an organization’s operations
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2002).
The current study focuses on the culture component of the Organizational
Climate safety, a sublayer of Organizational Influences. This is the highest and
first layer of safety. Ideally, eliminating or mitigating risk at this layer may prove
the most effective method of managing latent failures. The iceberg safety model
provides yet another perspective to safety analysis.

The Iceberg Model
A positive safety culture coupled with employee familiarity with a safety
reporting system could promote efficient safety reporting behavior (Adjekum et al.,
2015). As presented by Rose (2006), the Iceberg model describes the
relationship between reporting culture, data integrity, and interpretation of data.
In the model, an entire iceberg represents total risk. Visible risk, which is the
observable and reported incidents and accidents, is symbolized by the visible
part of the iceberg. Latent risk, not readily apparent, often not even from captured
data, is denoted by the submerged portion of the iceberg. In an ideal safety
management scenario, the entire iceberg would float on top of the water.
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Capturing as much valuable data as possible optimizes the visibility of the entire
iceberg.
The goal of SMS is to attain an organization safety culture that continually
nurtures positive safety behavior such as recording of incidents and accidents
(Rose, 2006). Brown, Willis, and Prussia (2001) asserted that every accident
results from a failure in the organization. Tsay et al. (2014) supported the idea
and suggested a weak safety culture is often the latent cause of human factors
related accidents and incidents, and the cause of long term safety implications.
McDonald, Corrigan, Daly, and Cromie, (2000) had earlier proposed that airlines
should consider including management and organizational factors in their safety
management systems. The researchers argued a comprehensive approach
would be more effective in managing latent safety variables, echoing other
researchers such as Reason (1997), and Shappell and Wiegmann (2000).
Modern safety management systems such as SMS are designed to promote
safety reporting to maximize exposure of the iceberg. They purport to make
safety reporting and other positive safety behavior part of the organizational
culture (FAA, 2015).

2.5

Safety Culture and Safety Climate

The terms terms safety culture and safety climate are often, erroniously,
interchanged (Hecker & Goldenhar, 2014; Zohar, 2010). Although there has been
a wide breadth of studies partaining to safety culture, there is no widely agreed
definition of safety culture (Cooper, 2000; Patankar, Brown, Subin, & Bigda-
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Peyton 2012; Reason, 1998). For example, Cooper (2000) defines safety culture
as “Shared values, actions and behavior that demonstrate a commitment to
safety over competing goals and demands” (p. 113). Cooper (2000) suggests
safety culture as a dominating sub-component of corporate culture. As such,
safety culture is a critical element of safety, especially in high-reliability
organization. Patankar et al.’s (2012) definition of safety culture is “why we do
what we do” (p. 5). A common thread among many of the definitions of safety
culture is the inclusion of the behaviors, values, and actions elements (Cooper,
2000). Patanker et al (2012) argues that safety culture has two components,
behavior and attitude. The behavioral study is concerned with understanding the
link between behavior and consequences, such as accidents. The attitude
component pertains to understanding of the dominant psychological status within
an organization. The present study is concerned about the latter component of
safety culture. The present defines safety culture as:
A dynamically balanced, adaptable state resulting from the configuration
of values, leadership strategies, and attitudes that collectively impact
safety performance at the individual, group, and enterprise level. Simply
stated, safety culture is a dynamic configuration of factors at multiple
levels that influences safety performance. (Patanker & Subin, 2010, pp.
102)
In 1980, Zohar conducted what among the first safety climate studies. In
the study, in which he developed a safety climate survey by analyzing results
from factory workers in Israel, Zohar described safety climate as the perception
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shared by employees of the relative importance of safety behavior in their work.
In the year 2000, Zohar argued that safety climate pertains to perceptions shared
regarding the priority given to safety, against productivity. Essentially, safety
climate describes employee perception of the management’s commitment to
employee safety and health (Flin et al, 2000). The present study recognizes
safety climate as presented by Patankar et al. (2012) as the attitude and opinion
of employee regarding safety in an organization.
Safety culture and safety climate focus of safety though they are different
constructs (Hecker & Goldenhar, 2014). Safety climate pertains to the prevailing,
albeit temporal status of perception of safety in an organization, while safety
culture relates to deeper long-held perceptions of underlying traits and value of
safety (Patankar et al., 2012; Patankar & Subin, 2010; Seo, Torabi, Blair, & Ellis,
2004).
Aviation accident rates have improved since the inception of aviation due
to sound engineering practices and adoption of effective human factors
measures such as crew resource management (CRM) (FAA, 2015). The focus
on improving safety by the aviation industry is increasingly shifting towards other
elements of safety, such as organizational factors. Positive safety culture aims to
instill perceptions and attitudes that promote desirable safety behaviors, such as
reporting of incidents and accidents. Referring to safety culture as the “human
performance element” (Taylor, 2012, p. 2), underscores the role of safety culture
in managing safety. Lack of understanding and proper management of safety
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culture can result in “failure in designated engineering or procedural safety
barriers” (Taylor, 2012, p. 2).

2.5.1 Background and Development of Safety Culture
The term ‘safety culture’ is thought to have been first reported in the
International Atomic Energy Agency’s Chernobyl accident report (Patankar et al.,
2012; Reason, 1998; Tsay, 2015). The evolution of safety culture can be traced
back to a series of accidents in the 1980s, mostly in Europe, that heralded the
systematic evaluation and management of safety (Hudson, 2001a). Prior to the
mid-1980s, safety was viewed as an individual responsibility. In 1974 a chemical
plant close to Flixborough, a village in North Lincolnshire England, exploded
causing 28 fatalities and 36 serious injuries. Improper engineering modifications
were identified as the cause of the accident. This event, also known as the
Flixborough accident, resulted in among other things, the first efforts to formalize
safety plans, already in place within organizations (Hudson, 2001a).
Two years later, a chemical plant explosion in northern Milan, Italy,
released a plume of dioxin over Seveso, a nearby town (Tsay, 2015). Known as
the Seveso incident, its effects included animal deaths, abortions, and ailments
such as nausea and skin irritation. Implications for safety included a European
Union directive, 76/82/EEC, also known as the Seveso directive. The directive
called for standardization of industrial safety regulations (Hudson, 2001a).
In 1988 (Hudson, 2001a; Thompson, 2015), Piper Alpha, an offshore oil
production platform in the North Sea exploded causing 167 fatalities. Regarded
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as the worst offshore accident in the world, the Piper Alpha accident further
generated advocacy for systematic management of safety. The explosion was
triggered when an employee turned on a pump that was under repair, against
safety guidelines. Investigation determined that failure to follow established
maintenance protocol created conditions that led to the unsafe acts of the
employee in question (Thomson, 2015). The Piper Alpha accident further elicited
the development of SMS. SMS was subsequently integrated into healthcare
management, and later adopted by other industries including nuclear and
aviation (Hudson, 2001a). Figure 2 demonstrates Hudson’s (2001a) description
of the development of safety culture.

Figure 3. The evolution of safety culture
Adapted from “Safety management and safety culture: the long, hard and
winding road” by P.T.W. Hudson, 2001a, Occupational health and safety
management systems, 3-32.
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2.5.2 Types of Safety Culture
Scholars have presented various ideologies of a safety culture such as
Westrum’s (1993) model. The well-documented model (see Table 4) has three
categories, pathological, bureaucratic, and generative safety cultures.
Table 4 Westrum’s Original Safety Model
Pathological

Bureaucratic

Information is hidden

Information may be ignored

Messengers are shirked
Responsibilities are
shirked

Messengers are tolerated
Responsibility is
compartmented
Bridging is allowed but
discouraged
Organization is just and
merciful
New ideas create problems

Bridging is discouraged
Failure is covered up
New ideas are crushed

Generative
Information is actively
sought
Messengers are trained
Responsibilities are shared
Bridging is rewarded
Failure causes enquiry
New ideas are welcome

Note. Adapted from “Cultures with Requisite Imagination” by R. Westrum, 1993 in In J.Wise, P.
Stager & J. Hopkin (Eds.) Verification and Validation in Complex Systems, Human Factors Issues.
p. 402. Copyright 1993 by Springer

Using Westrum’s (1993) original safety model as bedrock, Hudson’s (2001a)
developed a sequential safety culture maturity model as illustrated in figure 4.
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Figure 4.. Evolution of model of safety culture.
Adapted from “Safety management and safety culture: the long, hard and winding road”
by P.T.W. Hudson, 2001, Occupational health and safety management systems, 3-32.

Hudson (2001a) cites an organization with a pathological state of safety culture
as one that does not put any significant effort towards managing safety.
Employees do not take any personal responsibilities and accountabilities for
safety. In a reactive safety culture, an organization, usually experiencing a higher
number of accidents, takes appropriate corrective measures after the fact. In the
calculative safety culture, an organization realizes the importance of having
systems in place to manage safety hazards. A calculative safety culture is
characterized by considerations of elements such as cost-benefit analysis and
quantitative risk assessment techniques in safety matters. Some form of a
structured management system pertaining to safety is usually in place. While
regulatory platforms can promote safer practices, a generative safety culture is
ideal for optimum safety behaviors. A generative culture is characterized by a
strong belief and conviction within and among employees as it pertains to the
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importance of safety in their organization. The belief is strong to the point of
almost invisibility as safety considerations become part of daily organizational
and personal tasks (Hudson, 2001a).
Comparatively, the FAA (2015) groups safety culture into three categories,
reactive, proactive, and predictive (figure 5). The first two categories are
acknowledged by other scholars (Gerede, 2014; Liou et al., 2008; Stolzer et al.,
2008) as approaches to safety management. The FAA (2015) advocates to the
aviation community, the achievement of a predictive safety culture. A predictive
approach to safety focuses on the environment and organizational processes to
identify future problems (FAA, 2015).

Figure 5.. Methods of identifying hazard
From “Safety Management System SMS explained” by FAA, 2015

The historical methods of safety management, by themselves, are not
ideal for managing safety in a generative safety culture organization (Cooper,
2000, Liou, 2008). An examination of the perceptions of employees towards
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safety procedures, systems, policies, and practices could improve the
prominence and effectiveness of organizational safety in organizations with
generative cultures. This study evaluated employee perception of their
organization’s safety programs and practices.

2.5.3 Evaluating Safety Culture and Safety Climate
Understanding safety culture may help identify latent unsafe safety
variables and improve safety (von Thaden, 2008). Safety culture assessment is
most effective when carried out by a third party specialist (Taylor, 2012), as well
as when the entire hierarchy is evaluated (Cooper, 2000; Taylor, 2012; Wreathall,
1995). Involvement of third party minimizes “any possible compromise or,
hierarchical pressures that may arise from an internally staffed review” (Taylor, p.
161). However, lack of validated assessment instruments is among the major
challenges to investigating safety culture and safety climate (Adjekum, 2014;
Patankar et al., 2012). As such, scholars have called for further research
regarding validation tools (Adjekum, 2014; Chen & Chen, 2011). Nevertheless,
some efforts have been successful in evaluating safety culture.
Safety culture and safety climate may be evaluated qualitatively,
quantitatively, or using both methods (Cooper, 2000, Gibbons et al., 2006;
Patankar et al., 2012; Taylor, 2012). Historical reviews, participant observation,
group discussion, and case studies are examples of qualitative methods. A
mixed method approach is ideal as it allows for a comprehensive evaluation of
safety culture and safety climate (Hennick, 2014; Patankar et al., 2012). Patankar
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et al. (2012) presents a more comprehensive classification of safety culture and
safety assessment tools in four groups: case analysis, survey analysis,
qualitative analysis, and quasi-experimental analysis.
Case studies are suitable for analyzing accidents, incidents, and
undesirable events (Patankar et al., 2012). However, the retrospective nature of
case studies renders them useless for events already occurred. Surveys are
ideal for evaluating attitudes and opinions as well as provide the current
organization safety climate standing. Surveys are practical for evaluating
employee perceptions of safety. Qualitative analysis concerns techniques
including interviews, field observations, and focus groups. Qualitative analyses
are ideal for determining the predominant safety cultures at an organization.
Qualitative analyses describe the prevailing policies, procedures, and practices in
place at an organization, and how they relate to safety culture. Qualitative
research may also help researchers understand organizational group dynamics,
underlying values related to safety culture, as well as feedback on success and
failures associated with safety. The knowledge about elements of safety culture
such as perceptions of safety, safety values, and group dynamics may be useful
in improving an organization’s safety (Patankar et. al, 2012).
Qualitative methods allow researchers to interact directly with participants
and capture participants’ opinions and views (Wreathall, 1995). Qualitative
approaches facilitate in-depth understanding and interpretation of data, results,
and observations. Quantitative methods are easier to carry out and interpret as
they follow a well-defined framework. On the other hand, quantitative methods
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capture and measure data numerically. Highly standardized and calibrated,
quantitative methods include well-structured interviews; questionnaires and
surveys; and Q-sorts (Wreathall, 1995).
Rousseau (1990) asserted that quantitative methods are ideal for
measuring an organization’s responses to standardized stimuli. Standard stimuli
allow for common reference points with which to base responses from and
understand variations within and across respondents.
Taylor (2012) and Wreathall (1995) point out culture, and safety climate
(Cooper, 2001) can vary across groups in an organization, based on elements
such as profession and job function. Wreathall (1995) suggests including crosssectional analysis in organizational and cultural studies to investigate such
variations. In addition to concerns pertaining to validity of data collection tools
(Adjekum, 2014; Patankar et al., 2012), another major limitation of safety climate
and safety culture studies is that they only provide a snap shot of culture (Cooper,
2000; Patankar et al., 2012). Due to the dynamic nature of cultures, Cooper
(2000) and Patankar et al. (2012) suggest longitudinal studies to establish safety
culture and safety climate trends.
Ultimately, the use of the combined methods provides a more
comprehensive study analysis (Wreathall, 1995). The current study proposed to
employ both qualitative and quantitative methods. A method of analysis of safety
culture is through the use of safety climate surveys.
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (2005) defines a safety climate survey
as “usually a questionnaire or interview-based method for eliciting information
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regarding employees’ attitudes, opinions and feelings towards safety, and its
management within the organization” (p. 16). Safety culture surveys enable an
organization to “monitor the success of initiatives to improve safety culture” and
“Improve employee awareness of and involvement in safety” (HSE, 2005, p. 16).
Safety culture evaluation methods share similar key aspects to those of
safety management systems, such as assurance of confidentiality, ease of use,
and accessibility (HSE, 2005). Evaluation methods should facilitate effective
communication with participants and be relevant to their area of work to realize
research validity. Other considerations include the logistical aspect of accessing
participants and the duration of time required for a particular method. For
example, surveys that are too long may promote partial completion by
participants (HSE, 2005).

2.6

Group Cultures and Safety Related Theories

Cooper (2000) views safety culture as the most significant element of as a
corporate culture. Helmreich and Merritt (2001) describe corporate or
organizational culture as “a complex framework of national, organizational and
professional attitudes and values within which groups and individuals function” (p.
552). In 1998, Helmreich described these three structures as:
1. national culture encompasses the value system of particular
nations,
2. organizational/corporate culture differentiates the behavior found in
various organizations, and
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3. professional culture differentiates the behavior found in different
professional groups. (p. 24)
This study focused on organizational safety culture. Reason
(2000) described organizational safety culture as the “ability of individuals or
organizations to deal with risks and hazards so as to avoid damage or losses and
yet still achieve their goals” (p. 4). Comprehensively, a safety culture can be
understood as the expression of the aggregate effect of individual and group
attitudes, competencies, values, and behaviors, which collectively determine the
organization’s approach to safety matters (Clarke, 1999; ICAO, 2009).

Reciprocal safety culture model
Cooper (2000) advocated for examining safety culture beyond shared
values and beliefs, while assessing organizational cultures. These additional
elements include the relationships between people (psychological), jobs
(behavioral) and the organization (situational). The reciprocal safety culture
model reflects the concept of safety culture as a function of the relationship of
three properties, person, situation, as they pertains to safety climate and culture
under, two groups. The Internal psychological factors group refers to the person
while the External observable factors group comprises of the behavior and
situation components. The safety climate refers to individuals’ attitudes and
perceptions towards an organization’s safety systems and safety environment.
Safety climate may be measured through perceptual audits such as a safety
climate questionnaire. The group external observable factors contain the
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situation and the behavior components. The situation describes the safety
management system in place, which can be evaluated objectively through audits
and inspections. The behavior component refers to safety behavior. The
organizational culture is then a product of the dynamic reciprocal associations
between an organization’s members’ perceptions and attitudes towards the
organization’s goals; members' daily guided behavior; and the quality and
accessibility of the organization’s structures intended to support expected
behavior (Cooper, 2000).
Patankar and Sabins’ (2010) provides a more comprehensive view of
safety culture, presented as a pyramid composed of four layered components.
The Behaviors layer forms the tip of the pyramid and determines safety
performance. The other three layers in ascending order are Safety climate,
Safety strategies, and Safety values. Safety climate refers to employee “attitudes
and opinions regarding safety” (p. 3). Safety strategies pertain to the
organizational structures such as policies and procedures put in place to manage
safety while safety values refer to underlying tenets related to safety in an
organization (Patankar & Sabin, 2010).
The current study proposed to investigate the three facets represented by
Bandura’s (1986) Social Cognitive Theory and Cooper’s (2000) concept of
reciprocal causation. Employee perceptions (the psychological aspect) were
evaluated against employee jobs (behavior) as well as the organization’s
structures and environment (situation). Cooper’s theory shares some parallelism
to Geller’s (1994) concept of group cognitive behavior.
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Geller (1994) theorized that an ideal safety culture is composed of three
elements, individual, environment, and behavior. The individual component
defines the psychological and mental states as abilities, intelligence, and
knowledge. The environmental aspect includes standard operation procedures
(SOPs) as well as tools and equipment. The behavioral component comprises
actions such as regulatory compliance, communication, and hazard identification
(Geller, 1994). Tsay et al. (2014) cites social cognitive behavior theory (SCT) as
demonstrating the relationship between safety culture and safety behavior. SCT
(Wood & Bandura, 1989) emphasized that learning is achieved through
observation of environment and occurs within the social context. The theory is
closely aligned to the concept of reciprocal causation, “behavior, cognitive, and
other personal factors and environmental events operate as interacting
determinants that influence each other bi-directionally ” (para 1). Individuals, their
behavior, and the environment influence each other reciprocally.
According to Parker, Lawrie, and Hudson (2006), a positive safety culture
can reduce accidents in an organization by emphasizing that ‘social forces’ act
upon members of an organization (p. 2). Lack of a strong, positive, social force
may lead to unsafe behavior. Hudson (2007) attributes the lack of a positive
safety organizational culture as the main cause of accidents such as the space
shuttle Columbia accident (NASA, 2003). Parker et al. (2006) further affirms that
developing a more robust organizational safety culture may have more positive
implications on aviation safety compared to enhanced supervision or tougher
safety procedures.
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Parker et al. (2006) echoes Reason’s (2000) position on the effect of
safety culture on behavior, but warned the influence of an organization’s safety
culture eventually plateaus. To avoid the plateauing effect, organizations have to
regularly capture employee feedback and revaluate remedial measures (Lee,
1998; Taylor, 2012). Employee feedback regarding their perception of the safety
culture and values may be a strong indicator of their likely behavior towards
safety related considerations. Feedback that reflects employee perceptions may
be a strong indicator of likely employee behavior towards safety related
considerations. The current study evaluated employee perception of
organizational safety culture as an assessment of safety standing and culture in
the subject organization.
Due to the complexities of modern organizations, the rate of development
of safety culture is likely to vary between groups or sections of an organization
(Parker et al., 2006). Considerations for professional cultures (Helmreich & Merrit,
2001) related to safety are also important. As such, cross-sectional safety
assessments involving departments and groups in an organization may enhance
thorough evaluation of an organization’s safety standing. Such evaluation may
allow mitigation measures to be customized to specific departmental and/or
group needs. The current study included a cross-sectional design to investigate
possible inter-departmental differences and professional cultural variances. The
study also investigated differences in safety perceptions between front-line
employees and managers.
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This study proposed to investigate the airline’s organizational safety
climate by assessing the five basic elements/characteristics of an organizational
safety culture as defined by Reason (1997). These are:


an informed culture-one in which those who manage and operate
the system have current knowledge about the human, technical,
organizational and environmental factors that determine the safety
of the system as a whole,



a reporting culture: a culture in which people are willing to report
errors and near misses,



a just culture: a culture of 'no blame' where an atmosphere of trust
is present and people are encouraged or even rewarded for
providing essential safety-related information- but where there is
also a clear line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior



a flexible culture which can take different forms but is characterized
as shifting from the conventional hierarchical mode to a flatter
professional structure.



a learning culture - the willingness and the competence to draw the
right conclusions from its safety information system, and the will to
implement major reforms when the need is indicated (p. 8-2 – 8-3).

Taylor (2012) also proposes that high-hazard low-risk disciplines have a
“broadly agreed good safety culture practice characteristics” (p. 132). These five
safety culture characteristics are:
A. Safety is a clearly recognized value
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B. Leadership for safety is clear
C. Accountability for safety is clear
D. Safety is intergraded into all activities
E. Safety is learning-driven
These general characteristics form a benchmark of these industries with
subtle variations depending upon the emphasis placed by a particular
researcher (Taylor, 2012, p. 132).

2.7

Perceptions and Safety

Crutchfield and Roughton (2013) describe perception as a factor of safety
culture. Perceptions of safety extend beyond the opinions of how the
management and employees handle safety. It includes past perceptions, past
style of management, approach to safety, priority given to safety, and nature of
communication concerning safety related matters. Understanding the current
organizational perceptions of safety is essential to any safety improvement
measures including efforts to shape safety culture. An important aspect of
perception is its dynamic nature, which calls for constant reviews (Crutchfield &
Roughton, 2013; Gerede, 2014; Parker et al., 2006; Reason 1998).

2.8

Safety Framework in Organizations

An ideal safety environment operates on the premise of commitment to
safety policies, procedures, and practices by all members of an organization. An
ideal organization has a sound management structure with well-defined roles and
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expectations related to safety. Additionally, the organization ought to have a
vigorous and healthy hierarchical and psychological platforms and relationships
that support the five characteristics of safety culture as defined by Reason (1997).
Tsay et al. (2014) stressed the importance of a well-defined organizational
structure and its role in the safety management process. While developing a
safety culture evaluation tool for a commercial airline, Tsay et al. (2014)
presented a human-factors centered organizational safety culture assessment
model. His overall model consisted of four levels: organizational system,
executive, immediate supervisors, and staff. Taylor (2012) took a similar position
to Tsay et al. (2014) regarding the role of organizational hierarchy in the
management of safety. Taylor recognized organizational hierarchy as a
significant factor of influence in safety culture. He defines the four organizational
hierarchies as executives and senior managers, middle managers, supervisors,
and the workforce team. Tsay et al.’s (2014) organizational system was further
categorized to include safety policy, safety management system, and
organizational resources and functionality.
An organization’s management component consists of top and immediate
management. The top management, also known as executives, are viewed as
responsible for, and assessed from the viewpoint of their commitment to safety.
In their HFACS model, Shappell and Wiegmann’s (2000) noted that top
managers are responsible for, among other variables, Organizational Influences
that include safety climate and safety culture. Tsay et al. (2014) emphasized
immediate management, also known as immediate supervisors, are evaluated
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based on their activities related to safety and their attitudes. This observation
also parallels Shappell and Wiegmann’s (2000) HFACS model in reference to the
level of Unsafe Supervision. Staff members are evaluated for their attitude
towards safety and on their safety-related communication with their colleagues
and with their superiors (Tsay et al. 2014). Liou et al. (2008) and Reason (2009)
note that front-line employees are critical to airline operational safety. They form
the last line of defense in a system. As such, they are equally critical in
implementing and reevaluating safety management programs. It is also
paramount that front-line employees adhere to the organization’s safety
philosophy. Equally important, is the support front-line employees receive from
management, as well as that which they provide to the management through the
various safety reporting channels. Feedback should be efficiently received,
captured, and appropriately acted upon (Liou et al., 2008). A positive safety
culture is essential for effecting their roles.
In a positive safety culture, information flows both top-down and bottom-up.
A poor safety culture would customarily feature a predominantly top-down
communication model. A comprehensive organizational safety culture
assessment encompasses all employee levels in an organization for a more
elaborate analysis. SMS is designed to optimize organizational hierarchies with
defined roles and responsibilities to facilitate a smooth systematic management
of safety (FAA, 2015).
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2.9

Safety Management Systems

The Safety Management System (SMS) is a well-structured top-down
comprehensive approach to identifying and managing risk in an organization
(GAO, 2014; ICAO, 2009). Rather than establishing a separate safety system,
SMS intends to integrate systematic procedures, policies, and practices within
existing safety structures. Ayres et al. (2009) identified two main purposes of
SMS as “… to reduce safety risk for passengers, aircraft, personnel, and property
to a level as low as reasonably practical (ALARP)…” (p. 28) and to aid
management in balancing operational volume, safety, and cost. Rose (2006)
provides the most comprehensive objective of SMS, as attaining an
organizational safety culture that continually nurtures positive safety behavior
such as safety reporting.
According to Ayres et al. (2009), SMS carries with it many benefits,
including:


Reduced likelihood of accidents



Reduced costs relating to accidents and incidents



Assurances that a systematic process of monitoring and addressing
safety issues, in a transparent and informed way, is in place



The potential for reduced insurance and liability costs



Competitive advantage and possibility of more business
opportunities



Improved regulatory compliance. (p. 31)
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According to Stolzer et al. (2008), “SMSs provide organizations with a
powerful framework of safety philosophy, tools, and methodologies that improve
their ability to understand, construct, and manage proactive safety systems” (p.
1). SMS presents the latest method of approach to safety management that
focuses more on organizational aspects of safety. Predecessor approaches of
managing safety have focused on areas including engineering/technical and
human aspects of safety.
ICAO currently requires its 191 member states to implement SMS
(Mourino, 2007). The implementation is directed under Annexes such as Annex 6
– Operation of Aircraft, Annex 14 – Aerodrome, and Annex 11 Air Traffic
Services. Under ICAO directives, international carriers and international airports
are required to establish and practice SMS. State regulators such as the FAA
encourage other sectors of aviation such as flight training to adopt SMS. The
FAA (2015b) requires “most U.S. commercial airlines” (para. 1) to establish SMS
by 2018. The success of SMS has led to its employment in industries such as
energy and healthcare.
This study focuses on non-engineering areas of safety such as
organizational culture, risk management, and decision theory in aviation that are
well represented in SMS. The study examines employee perceptions of safety
culture as an indicator of safety behavior, and of the subject airline’s
organizational safety environment.
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2.9.1 Components of a Safety Management System
While SMS is practiced in many parts of the world (Mourino, 2007), there
are variations in the approach to SMS design (Chen & Chen, 2011). ICAO’s
(2013) SMS model has four components with 13 elements. The four components
are Safety policy and objective, Safety risk management, Safety assurance, and
Safety promotion. The SMS guiding principle issued by Transport Canada (2008)
has six key components: Safety management plan; Documentation; Safety
planning, Safety oversight, Training; and Quality assurance program.
Other SMS models include that of the United Kingdom Civil Aviation
Authority (UKCAA, 2010) that has 11 components and that of the Australian Civil
Aviation Safety Authority (CASA, 2005) that has eight key elements. These
variations may provide some challenges when implementing the chosen SMS
model. The current study recognized components of SMS as defined by the FAA
(2015). The components are Safety policy, Safety risk management, Safety
promotion, and Safety assurance. Figure 6 illustrates FAA’s (2015) SMS model.
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Figure 5. Components of SMS as defined by FAA (2015)
From “Safety Management System SMS explained” by FAA, 2015

According to FAA (2015), Safety Risk Management (SRM) and Safety Assurance
(SA) are the most important elements of SMS and the most interactive as
depicted in figure 6.

Figure 6. Interaction between SRM and SA (FAA, 2015)
From “Safety Management System SMS explained” by FAA, 2015
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The Safety Risk Management identifies a hazard and performs a risk
assessment. Appropriate risk controls are determined and applied. Safety
assurance assesses the effectiveness of the risk control measures put in place.
The relationship between Safety Risk Management and Safety Assurance
underscores the need for a sound organizational structure with thorough
authority, effective flow of information, accountabilities, as well as documentation
and procedures. In addition to the four identified elements, there is an additional
“…intangible, but always critical, aspect called safety culture” (FAA, 2015, para.
2).
While SMS is a robust safety management program (FAA, 2015; GAO,
2014; ICAO, 2009) and has been effective (Ayres et al., 2009), scholars have
addressed safety culture as a significant variable in the effectiveness of any
safety program (IATA, 2011; Lewis, 2008). This is especially so given the
dynamic nature of culture and the operational environment of the aviation
industry (Taylor, 2012). They dynamic nature of culture demands that it be
assessed regularly for nurturing and sustaining a positive safety culture. Likewise,
there is need to understand the aviation operational environment as a factor of
implementing a robust safety program.

2.9.2 Aviation Operational Environment
The aviation industry consists of many systems that have to interact
together seamlessly for efficiency, cost effectiveness, and for safe operations.
The systems include aircraft, airports, and airspace, as well as relevant rules and
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regulations. Wilke (2013) examined one such operational environment, the
airport. Wilke (2013) described airports as “…complex systems involving the
continuous interaction of human operators with the physical infrastructure,
technology and procedures to ensure the safe and efficient conduct of flights” (p.
4). For instance, airport runway and taxiway operations need to balance the
needs of five major airport stakeholders: pilots, airport operators, air traffic control,
regulations, and ground handling. The complexity of the interaction of
stakeholders could result in a major risk of critical failure in one of the
stakeholders. Besides the infrastructural and process elements of aviation
operations, human factors remain a key consideration for safety. For instance,
aviation personnel are affected by the physical, psychological, and physiological
factors that occur in their work environment (Wilke, 2013).
Johnson, Mason, Hall, and Watson (2001) underscore the effect of fatigue
on aviation safety, especially as it pertains to three safety critical groups: pilots,
air traffic controllers (ATC), and maintenance technicians. However, while the
physical working conditions of pilots and ATC are fairly comfortable and uniform,
maintenance technicians’ work environment varies considerably with time.
Maintenance technicians can be subjected to adverse working conditions such
as extreme temperatures, poor ventilation, and varying moisture. Maintenance
technicians may also work in small spaces that limit natural body movements.
Lack of sufficient sleep, extreme temperatures, noise, and poor lighting are some
of the other factors that can contribute to diminished work performance of
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maintenance technician. Such working conditions can increase fatigue that can
cause or contribute to latent unsafe conditions (Johnson et al., 2001).
Harris (2011) presents some of the physiological and physical stressors of
pilots. Physical stressors are environmental factors such as vibration, noise,
disorientation, and humidity that can “severely affect the ability of pilots to
perform all tasks, such as decision making and aircraft control” (p. 160).
Physiological elements such as stress and fatigue can be common in aviation
personnel due to stressful working conditions, high workload, time pressure, and
personal life factors. While some employees may have a higher threshold of
stress, others may resort to less desirable coping methods such as use of
alcohol, which may increase operational safety risks (Harris, 2011).

2.9.3 Factors of Implementing SMS
The benefits of SMS have been documented (FAA, 2015) and efforts are
underway to mandate and/or promote SMS in aviation communities across the
world (Chen & Chen, 2011; Maurino, 2007). Various factors affect the effective
implementation of SMS programs such as the style of implementation. The role
of safety culture as a significant variable in the successful implementation and
management of SMS has been broadly explored (FAA, 2014; Liou et al., 2008;
Taylor, 2012). All measures considered, Reason (1998) argues that, generally,
persuasion not as effective in instituting organizational changes necessary for the
effective implementation of SMS, but action and performance, supported by
robust organizational structures as well as resources.
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Overall, SMS elements should be integrated seamlessly into an employee’s
daily activities for smooth transition into the SMS program (Chen & Chen, 2011).
Similarly, while the SMS architecture can be large and complex, ICAO (2013)
and the FAA (2015) point out the scalability of SMS. Scalability allows
organizations to customize the implementation and management of SMS to their
sizes, resources, and needs.
The roles of organizational hierarchy from top managers to front-line
employees have received much attention in the literature (Gill & Shergill, 2004;
Stolzer et al., 2008, 2011; Taylor, 2012). These roles include cultivating a
positive safety culture, allocating necessary resources to support SMS programs,
and providing feedback upwards as well downwards. Accountabilities of job
functions, duties, actions, and tasks should be clearly specified across the
organizational hierarchy. While group efforts are essential to promoting SMS,
Pearse, Gallagher, and Bluff (2001) and Taylor (2012) stress the significance of
one’s influence in the organization, as well as the level of networking one has, as
key to effecting change.
One of the main challenges in implementing SMS is the lack of uniformity
among the available SMS models (CASA, 2005; FAA, 2015; ICAO, 2013;
Transport Canada, 2008; UKCAA, 2010). The different models may pose
organizational and operational compatibility concerns as organizations operate in
shared environments. From an organizational point of view, culture itself can be a
hindrance to the required change. Nieva and Sorra (2003) point out that
organizational change is challenging, as organizational culture is the product of
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“individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns
of behavior” (p. ii18). As such, multiple intervention approaches such as training
and safety promotion are vital to transforming an organization to function as a
high-reliability organization. Similarly, an enabling spirit for change plays a
significant role in developing and sustaining a positive safety culture (Nieva &
Sorra, 2003). Incidentally, Taylor (2012) warns of attempts to completely change
an organization’s culture. Instead, gradual changes with periodic reevaluation of
the culture would be a more successful approach (Taylor, 2012).
Stolzer et al (2008) underscore the importance of change management in
the effectiveness of SMS by stating, “Without the commitment to effective safety
change management, no other aspect of SMS matters, regardless of how welldeveloped it might be” (p. 253). Stolzer et al. call for clarity and importance of the
elements of SMS as well as a passionate commitment to the management of the
change process. Ultimately, an SMS champion is key to leading the SMS
implementation efforts. The champion should be appointed, supported, and
empowered by the top management to be able to solicit necessary support and
influence from other stakeholders in the organization to effect change (Stolzer et
al., 2008).

2.10 Previous Studies
Scholars have explored aspects of organizational climate and safety culture
(FAA, 2012; Piece at al., 2009; von Thaden et al., 2003). An overarching theme
concerns the challenges of measuring safety perception and/or safety climate
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(Adjekum 2015; Rose, 2006; Vick, 2002). Vick (2002) describes safety an
abstract concept, and as such, difficult to objectively quantify. Rose (2006)
proposed conceptualization and standardization of analyzing human-factored
and organizationally related safety methods. Nevertheless, both quantitative and
qualitative methods have been proposed as ideal for conducting safety culture
studies (Wreathall, 1995).
Scholars have developed safety culture and safety climate assessment
tools based on these methods. The tools include surveys, interviews,
questionnaires, and checklists (Gao et al., 2015; Gibbons et al., 2006; HSE, 2005;
von Thaden et al., 2003). A common limitation of earlier, human-centered safety
assessment toolkits, is that they were mostly self-assessment questionnaires,
and as such, could only measure attitudes, perceptions, and opinions. Concerns
about standardization and validity of research tools have also been noted
(Adjekum, 2015; Gibbons 2009; Liou, Tzeng, & Chang, 2007). Nevertheless,
researchers have successfully carried out studies related to safety culture in
industries including aviation and medicine, with improved validity. Often,
researchers have developed their own research tools, or modified and validated
existing tools (Tsay et al., 2014).
Tsay et al. (2014) developed a safety cultural assessment survey tool
customized to the operational needs of China Airlines (CAL). The researchers
developed the survey in consultation with CAL and other aviation industry
experts. The questions developed were based on two criteria, level of employee,
and demographic information. Levels of employee defined the ranking order and
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included staff, immediate supervisor, and executive. Elements of SMS were
divided among employee ranks based on their respective roles and
responsibilities resulted in seven categories. The categories included safety
policy, safety management system, safety policy, safety commitment of top
managers, safety commitment by immediate supervisors, safety attitude and
communication, and safety perception. Demographic information included the
level of seniority and age. While the safety analysis tool met reliability and validity
requirements, a notable limitation was its inability to identify weakness factors in
the airline’s safety culture. Recommendations included use of focus groups in
subsequent applications (Tsay et al., 2014).
Earlier, Zohar (1980) had examined safety perceptions in the construction
industry. The researcher observed uniformity among groups as well as variation
across groups. This observation aligns with the concept of a professional-specific
culture within an organization as presented by Helmreich (1998). Cox and Cox
(1991) examined attitudes shared between employees that guided their
perceptions and behavior towards safety. Participants were employees of a
European company represented across several countries, occupation, and
occupation level. Researchers identified “…personal skepticism, individual
responsibility, the safeness of the work environment, the effectiveness of
arrangements for safety, and personal immunity” (Cox & Cox, 1991, p. 93) as
significant variables of attitude towards safety.
Gao, Bruce, and Rajendran (2015) conducted a cross-sectional safety
culture analysis between four groups of China Airlines employees: flight crew,
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flight engineers/maintenance, cabin crew, and ground/network operators. The
researchers observed an overall positive perception of the safety climate among
all employees. In addition, employment history appeared to be a factor of safety
climate across the groups. Junior employees indicated a higher positive
perception of the safety culture compared to seniors. This observation mirrored
similar findings by Gao et al. (2013) and Adjekum et al. (2015) who
recommended additional investigation of seniority as a factor of safety reporting.
In addition, the ground crew operators appeared to perceive safety culture more
positively, followed by the cabin crew group. Pilots reported the least
perceptiveness of the airline’s safety climate. The finding indicated more defined
organizational sub-cultures, aligned closely with the line of work. Gao et al. (2015)
recommended replicating the study with other airlines to test for generalizability
of their findings. Like Taylor (2012), the researchers also recommended
longitudinal studies to investigate the effect of the dynamism of policies, practices,
and procedures on perception of safety (Gao, Bruce, & Rajendran (2015).
One such longitudinal study was carried out by Varjavand, Bachegowda,
Gracely, and Novack (2012). Their study investigated the effect of increased riskawareness on medical-error disclosures, a decade apart. Participants, medical
interns at a university hospital, recorded an increased reporting by 33% and 26%
for lower-risk and higher-risk error-incidents respectively at end of the test
decade. Researchers attributed the improvements to new regulations, training,
and change in attitudes as well as beliefs about error disclosures. Researchers
recommended replication of the study in other geographical areas, institutions
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and professional levels to test for validation and limitation of their study
(Varjavand et al., 2012).
Researchers are challenged to employ more elaborate research techniques
such as incorporating interviews and document review in safety culture studies to
facilitate deeper understanding of an organizations’ safety environment (HSE,
2005). The ‘vertical slice’ method is also ideal for evaluating safety culture. The
method assesses “operational workforce, supervisory levels as well as
management and strategic thinking in order to identify if the right information,
norms, and values are being communicated down the hierarchy” (HSE, 2005, p.
38). The vertical slice method allows for determining whether down-up
communication exits in an organization (HSE, 2005). The current study applied
the vertical slice assessment tool to investigate the seamlessness of perception
of safety between the front-line employees and the management.

2.11 Summary
Chapter 2 reviewed previous studies related to the current research. It
explored the concept of safety culture, safety climate, and discussed factors of
organizational safety culture. In addition, this chapter discussed safety
management systems, highlighted safety framework in organizations, and
explored the relationship between the perception of safety culture and
organizational behavior. The next chapter will address the research design as
well as research methods and analysis tools employed in the current study.
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

3.1

Research Design

Researchers (Gibbons et al., 2006; Hennink, 2014) have recommended a
mixed method for safety culture studies. This research employed a crosssectional mixed method design. Data collection techniques used in the study
were on-line survey, semi-structured interviews, and focus group activities.
Safety climate surveys are the most popular tools for assessing safety climate
while qualitative data capture techniques such as interviews and focus groups
are ideal for assessing an organization’s safety culture (Hennink, 2014; Patankar
et al., 2012).
The first two phases of the current study were an on-line survey and
interviews. The survey had quantitative and qualitative components. The
researcher utilized the quantitative segment of the survey as a tool for capturing
the safety climate-related and SMS-related data. Safety climate data pertained to
research questions one and four, while SMS data were pertained to research
question two of the current study. The qualitative segment of the survey, as well
as the interview and focus group activity, captured data useful to assessing the
safety culture of the subject airline, represented by the research questions three.
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The researcher analyzed results from the interview and the qualitative
segment of the survey to identify common themes of interest that the researcher
explored further by a focus group activity. Table 5 summarizes the design for this
study.

Table 5 Summary of Study Design and Analysis
Research
question
1
2

3

4

Element
investigated

Data collection

Safety climate Survey - quantitative
segment
Survey - quantitative
SMS
segment
Survey - qualitative
segment
Safety culture
Interview
Focus group
Survey - quantitative
Safety climate
segment

Design and method

Tools

Descriptive crosssectional quantitative Kruskal-Wallis H Test
Descriptive crosssectional quantitative Kruskal-Wallis H Test
Explorative qualitative
Explorative qualitative
Explorative qualitative
Descriptive crosssectional quantitative

Thematic analysis
Thematic analysis
Thematic analysis
Kruskal-Wallis H Test

3.1.1 Quantitative Method
Quantitative methods can be used to evaluate the relationships between
dependent and independent variables. Descriptive, experimental, and
correlational research designs are usually carried out quantitatively. The
quantitative segment of this study was descriptive and correlational. Researchers
used the quantitative methods to assess, understand, and describe the safety
climate of the subject airline. Quantitative method is also intended to evaluate
any Key relationships between variables such as cross-groups perceptions.
According to Rousseau (1990), quantitative methods are ideal for
evaluating standardized stimuli of participants. Participants are presented with,
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and respond to the similar stimuli within defined parameters. The standard stimuli
may be presented to participants through various ways. For instance, similar
questions can be presented to participants through forms and media such as
online questionnaires or interviews. Presenting a standard stimulus to
participants allows a similar base from which respondents can be evaluated
(Rousseau, 1990). The qualitative methods in this study were represented by the
survey.
3.1.2 Qualitative Method
Wreathall (1995) identifies a major concern regarding quantitative research
design as its limited ability to offer in-depth understanding of results. Qualitative
methods allow for respondents’ objective interpretations of experiences and
meanings through words and images. The methods can also aid researchers to
understand the meaning behind responses generated by the stimuli presented
during a qualitative process. Other advantages include flexibility of research,
ability to develop new theories, and ability to understand complex inquiry
(Wreathall, 1995).
Creswell (2009) identifies four methods of qualitative data collection as
observations, interviews, documents, and audiovisual. Several observation
techniques exist which contain varying degrees of participation and observation
by both researcher and participant. While observation allows researcher firsthand
knowledge with participants, significant limitations include privacy concerns and
challenges related to working with children. Interviews can be conducted face-toface, through telephone, or in groups. Participants can often provide information
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indirectly, which may affect authenticity of the responses and results.
Researchers’ biases may also affect how interviews are conducted as well as
results. The Document technique involves collecting documents, public or private,
such as diaries and newspapers (Creswell, 2009).
The document technique may offer some flexibility to researchers
compared to methods like interviews (Creswell, 2009). For instance, publicly
available documents may be easier to access and may present fewer privacy
challenges than interview techniques. The technique captures data in
participants’ own language, which may improve the directness of the data. One
of the limiting aspects of document technique is the potential for inaccurate or
unauthentic data due to reasons such as presenter’s own biases. A researcher
may also have to transcribe or process data further, for usability, by methods
such as scanning which adds the workload and potential limitations pertinent to
transcribing. Audiovisual material includes sources such as films, art objects, and
photographs. Audiovisual materials can be imaginative, allowing “participants to
directly share their reality” (p. 187). Nonetheless, they may be difficult to interpret,
as well as not being readily available in the public domain (Creswell, 2009).
Berg et al. (2004) point out that unlike structured interviews that only
capture fixed responses from participants, semi-structured interviews present
predetermined open-ended questions that allow for in-depth follow-up on
questions and topics. Unstructured interviews have no standard defined
questions. Instead, unstructured interviews offer more flexibility to both
researcher and participant to explore areas of interest as they develop. Focus
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group activities also provide similar in-depth understanding of themes and topics
(Berg, Lawrence, & Lune, 2004).
This study employed focus groups and semi-structured interviews as
techniques to capture qualitative data.

3.1.3 Cross-Sectional Design
A Cross-Sectional design is ideal for indicating how responses are
represented across a study population (Creswell, 2009). Surveys are ideal for
capturing data in cross-sectional study. Limitations of this design include difficulty
in measuring change, as the study only performs a time snap shot of the
variables in question. A longitudinal study may allow for trend analysis. CrossSectional analysis does not account for the effect of confounding variables.
Additionally, it is unable to demonstrate cause and effect. The current study
evaluated front-line employees including pilots, flight attendants, maintenance,
and dispatch. It also evaluated the airline’s management team.

3.1.4 Nominal Group Technique
The nominal group technique (Harvey & Holmes, 2012) is effective in
managing focus group members’ participation. Nominal group technique enables
individuals to first, silently, write their ideas of a piece of paper. The papers are
then pinned on a board, grouped together in similarity of opinion, ideas, or
answers. Participants then discuss identified ideas regardless of who presented
them. This technique allows for a higher level of involvement by all group
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members. It checks dominance by some members and/or fear of participation by
others. In addition to using nominal group technique, this study applied a crosssectional design.

3.2

Study Survey

This study used survey as one of the three phases of the study. Other
phases were interviews and focus group activities. The survey tool captured data
to investigate the safety culture, SMS, and safety climate of the subject airline.

3.2.1 Survey Structure
The survey used in this study consisted of four sections. The sections were
salutation, demographics, structured questions, and open-ended question
section. The salutation section educated participants about the study, and invited
them to participate. It also informed participants’ rights regarding the study and
about the informed consent. The demographics section requested and captured
participants’ demographic information, such as age-range, the number of years a
participant had worked at the airline, and participant’s gender.
The third section contained structured questions that collected data
pertaining to employee perception of the subject airline’s safety climate. The
dimension safety climate elements assessed in the currently study were
Managements’ commitment to safety, Management’s Action, and Perceived
employee (Flint et al., 2000; Patankar et al., Seo et al., 2004; 2012; Zohar, 2000).
The questions in this section also captured participants’ perceptions of the four
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pillars of safety management system according to FAA (2015). The pillars were
Safety policy, Safety assurance, Quality assurance, and Safety promotion.
Questions in this section also solicited feedback on respondents’ perceptions of
management’s approach to managing the subject airline’s safety. Each of the
total seven elements under investigation (three dimensions of safety climate and
four pillars of SMS) in the third section on the survey was represented by
between, and including, three and seven questions. Some questions
transcended to more than one element.
The questions in the third section of the questionnaire were presented in a
5-point scale Likert format. The 5-point scale items were: ‘Strongly Disagree’,
‘Disagree’, ‘Neither Agree nor Disagree’, ‘Agree’, and ‘Strongly Agree’. These
scale items were covariates in the quantitative research segment of this study.
For this study, the highest and most positive value was ‘Strongly Agree’ and
‘Strongly Disagree’, the lowest. The researcher worded some questions such that
‘Strongly Disagree’ would be the most desirable option in ideal application and
‘Strongly Disagree’ the least desirable option. This change was done to check for
internal consistency within the scale items. Concerns pertaining to Likert scales
have been explored with conflicting opinions about the number of points of a
scale and whether even-numbered or odd-numbered (Joshi, Kale, Chandel, &
Pal, 2015). An odd-numbered Likert scale is viewed as providing more options to
participants than an even-scaled Likert (Joshi et al., 2015). However, Tsay et al.
(2014) argue that a 6-point scale, which is even, is useful in eliminating “…the
possible ambiguous option and to collect the subjects’ opinions explicitly” (p. 392)
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when compared to an odd-numbered Likert scale. Regarding the comparison
between a 5-point and a 7-point scale, the latter is viewed as providing more
options to a participant, thus measuring a construct more accurately (Joshi,
2015). While the options of the number of point-scale may have psychological
effects of the choices made by participants of the scale, the effect is minimal
(Wakita, Ueshima, & Noguchi, 2012).
The last section had a provision that solicited and allowed participants to
record any additional information or comments regarding the study. This
captured information provided qualitative data to complement quantitative entries
in the questionnaire.

3.2.2 Survey development
The challenges faced by researchers conducting safety culture studies,
related to availability of research tools as well as the validity of the research tools,
have been broadly discussed (Adjekum 2015). The current study used a survey
modified from that of Tsay at al. (2014) and Gao et al. (2015). The current study
slightly mirrors the preceding studies by Tsay et al. (2014) and Gao et al. (2015).
Additionally, surveys used in both studies were validated in their respective
studies.
A list of survey items were drawn from both surveys and considered for
the two sub-sections of the quantitative survey under the three perceptions or
dimensions of safety climate (Dedobbeleer & Béland, 1991; Flint et al., 2000;
Patankar et al., Seo et al., 2004; 2012; Zohar, 2000) and the four pillars of SMS
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(FAA, 2015). The list of questions underwent a further validation process. Subject
experts including human factors researchers, industry professionals, professors
in the aviation safety discipline, and an employee in the safety department from
the subject company, provided feedback. The final list of the quantitative
questions contained 20 questions, covering the three perceptions of safety
climate and the four pillars of SMS.
Surveys have advantages such as multiple channels of delivery, including
online, in person, and over the telephone. Surveys can be easy to analyze and
some, like web-based, economical to carry out. However, there is likelihood that
participants will provide inaccurate feedback through surveys. Surveys may also
experience a low response rate (Aaron, 2012). This survey was administered
online and used techniques that were aimed at increasing the response rate such
as extending the live time for the survey. The survey was also administered
through two media, the subject company’s Intranet and the monthly newsletter.

3.3

Interview

This study employed semi-structured interviews to capture data from nine
participants. Interview was one of the three phases of the study. The interview
phase sought to assess respondents’ general perceptions of the overall
organizational safety, safety culture, and safety climate. The semi-structured
Interviews had 10 key questions. The interviews were conducted over the
telephone and audio recorded. The interview questions underwent a validation
process similar to one described in the survey development section.
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3.4

Focus Group Activities

Kamberelis and Dimitriadis (p. 299, 2005), describe focus groups as
“…form of group interviews that capitalizes on communication between research
participants in order to generate data”. The focus group technique is seldom
used as a stand-alone technique and is recommended as part of a mixed method
approach to a study (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005), usually in a support role to
a primary technique such as survey (Hennink, 2014; NOAA, 2009). This method
helps to interpret results from the primary source. Scholars contend that focus
groups are not intended to garner consensus, but to better understand the
research topic by generating a wide range of relevant views (Hennink, 2014;
NOAA, 2009). When applied correctly, a focus group may discriminate less
against participants who cannot read or those who cannot write compared to
methods such as online surveys (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005). Participants
who would be hesitant to be interviewed individually may also be encouraged to
participate in focus groups, as it may appear to be comparatively less intrusive.
Like other data collection techniques, focus groups have disadvantages.
They include potential reluctance by some participants to participate in
discussion because they are shy or due to fear of punitive consequences
(Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005); possible dominant participants, focus group
activities require a less controlled environment (Hennink, 2014); and possible
polarization of participants by the moderator (NOAA, 2009). As suggested by
NOAA (2009) this study selected members of the same peer group to create a
more favorable environment that encouraged members’ participation. Focus
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group activities were conducted in two separate groups based on seniority: front
line employee and managers. When not properly moderated, some participants
may dominate the focus group sessions (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005, p. 299).
To address for time limitation, this study presented 12 questions for discussion,
well within the 12 to 15 questions for an hour session of focus group
recommended by Hennink (2014).
The size of a focus group is also critical in the success and productivity of a
focus group session. A group’s size should be “small enough for everyone to
have an opportunity to share insights and yet large enough to provide diversity of
perceptions” (Kruger & Casey, 2000, p. 10). Scholars have suggested group size
ranges of between, and including, five and 12 participants per group (Hennink,
2014; NOAA, 2009). Hennink (2014) however suggests the nature of a study
topic and type of research should have significant influence on the size of a focus
group. For example, a narrower-topic and specific-research study could utilize a
smaller-sized focus group than wider-topic and exploratory-type study. Following
the stipulated guidance, this study utilized eight participants for the focus group
activity.

3.5

Study Population

The airline investigated under this study is a US-based regional passenger
airline. The airline has several divisions and operates from multiple locations in
the US. The subject airline’s front-line employee groups, pilots, maintenance
technicians, dispatchers, and flight attendants, were the target population for this
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study, as well as the subject airline’s management. The subject airline was
selected for ease of access by the researcher. Participants had to be at least 18
years of age, and at the time, current employees of the subject airline.

3.6

Sampling Design

Sampling is the technique used to select subjects from a population for
study (Dattalo, 2008). Quantitative sampling purposes to obtain a sample that
has a fair representation of the population (Creswell, 2009). Due to factors such
as logistics, finance, and labor, researchers use samples to study populations.
To improve the accuracy of a study and its generalizability to the population or
other groups, a sample should fairly represent a study population (Dattalo, 2008).
A sample design determines the fairness and representativeness of a sample to
a population. It addresses how participants are selected into a sample as well as
the sample size (Dattalo, 2008).
Probability sampling accords equal chances of selection to all members of a
population into the sample (Dattalo, 2008). Simple, stratified, systematic, and
cluster sampling are examples of probability sampling. Simple random sampling
assigns numbers to participants in the population. A randomized technique such
as a random number generator is used to select numbers that represent selected
participants in the population. In systematic random sampling, a sequence is
selected from a list of the participants of a population, based on the population’s
size and required sample size. Stratified sampling is ideal when there is need for
a balanced representation from across the groups in the population. This study
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applied stratified sampling in the interview and focus group phases of the study.
The methods ensured equal representation of participants across the studied
groups. Cluster sampling allows sampling from a large population or a large
geographical area. Cluster sampling is very cost effective. However, within large
clusters, participants from within the cluster have much lower probability of being
selected. The probability proportionate to size (PPS) technique can reduce this
error. This study employed cluster sampling in the survey part of the study. The
survey was accessible to the entire population (Dattalo, 2008).
Nonprobability sampling is an alternative sampling design (Dattalo, 2008).
Nonprobability sampling addresses some of the challenges common to
probability sampling such as ethical concerns, cost, and time. However,
nonprobability sampling grants unknown chance of selection to all participants of
a population. This study employed purposeful sampling in the interview and focus
group phases of the study. In purposeful sampling, the researcher targets
participants in the population that would best serve the study’s goals. For
example, a researcher may select participants who are well knowledgeable in the
subject area of interest. The researcher has to have knowledge of elements of
the population to use this sampling method. Other nonprobability sampling
techniques include quota sampling and snowball sampling. Quota sampling is
similar to stratified sampling except quota sampling is non-probabilistic and it
warrants the sample “…represents certain characteristics in proportion to the
prevalence in the population” (p. 6). Snowball sampling utilizes networking to

81
recruit elements in the population. It is ideal when it is difficult to find suitable
candidates (Dattalo, 2008).

3.7

Sample Size

According to Newey and McFadden (1994), the desired effect size, alpha,
and beta values, determines a sample size. The alpha value defines type I error.
With type I error, the research concludes to a false positive, or falsely concludes
a treatment effect. Use of an alpha value of 0.05 is common in social sciences
(Newey & McFadden, 1994). An alpha value of 0.05 limits the probability of
committing type I error to 5%. The smaller the alpha value, the greater the
sample size required. The power or beta value determines type II error. Type II
error happens when a study falsely concludes there is no treatment effect while
there indeed is one (Field, 2009). A beta value of 0.8 is common in social
sciences (Newer & McFadden, 1994). A power of 0.8 gives the study an
assumption that there is a probability of 80% that the study will find a treatment
effect when one truly exists. The larger the sample size, the higher the power of
a study. Nakagawa and Cuthill (2007) define effect size as “…a relevant
interpretation of an estimated magnitude of an effect from the effect statistics” (p.
594). Effect size of approximately 0.2 can be considered small, 0.5 medium, or
0.8, large. The researcher of the current study used an alpha value of 0.05, and a
beta value of 0.8 to while carrying out relevant statistical analyses.
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3.8

Procedures, Administration, and Data Collection

A physical meeting to discuss the intentions of the study was held between
the researcher and safety managers of the subject airline. A verbal agreement
that included a non-disclosure clause was entered between the two parties
regarding this study. The study was carried out under the guidelines of Purdue’s
Human Research Protection Program (HRPP). The researcher obtained
approval for the present study from Purdue’s Institutional Review Board (IRB)
(see Appendix I). The study was conducted in three phases, online survey
questionnaire, interviews, and focus group activities. An employee from the
safety department of the subject company was the study’s ‘community
gatekeeper’, a liaison between the researcher and participants, as need arose.
Krueger and Casey (2000) underscore the importance of the role of community
gatekeepers. Gatekeepers can aid with the recruitment of participants; facilitate
access to the population of interest; and enable accessibility to trusted and valid
participants. The researcher visited the subject airline for discussions about the
study. The researcher made subsequent visits to the airline and maintained
communication with the liaison throughout the period of the study.

3.8.1 Survey
An approval was sought (Appendix H) and obtained (Appendix I) from the
researcher institution’s IRB regarding the final validated survey. A link leading to
the online survey was posted on the subject airline’s monthly safety newsletters
and the subject airline’s Intranet. The link was hosted on Qualtrics® secure
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servers for reliability and privacy considerations. Data were also captured and
stored on Qualtrics®. The survey link stayed live for a period of 12 weeks.
3.8.2 Interviews
The validated semi-structured interview questions were approved by
Purdue’s IRB. The interviews were conducted over the telephone. The study
liaison coordinated the purposeful and stratified samplings of participants by
helping to identify potential participants in each of the studied groups that were
knowledgeable in the subject areas of interest. Stratified sampling encouraged a
fair representation across the groups being studied (Dattalo, 2008). The groups
under this study were pilots, flight attendants, maintenance personnel, dispatch,
and managers. Purposeful sampling made more likely that participants were
knowledgeable in the study subject area (Dattalo, 2008). The purpose of the
interviews was to assess general employee perception of safety at the subject
airline. Interviews also allow for an in-depth understanding, reasoning, and
meaning of themes and concerns identified by participants (Creswell, 2009).
With the assistance of the liaison, the researcher recruited interview
participants. The liaison forwarded the study’s information sheet (Appendix A)
and a recruitment statement (Appendix B) to the participants. The information
sheet educated the participants on a number of aspects of the study including its
purpose, participants’ rights, and researcher’s contact information. The
recruitment statement solicited participants’ participation to the study. It also
informed them about participant’s anonymity, length of interview, and
researcher’s contact information.
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Some participants communicated to the researcher through email or
telephone to set up the phone-interview appointment time. Participants were
greeted at the beginning of the interview call. Participants were asked to
acknowledge whether they had received and read the recruitment statement and
the study information sheet. Participants were read the recruitment statement if
they did not acknowledge receiving or reading a copy. A verbal consent for audio
recording of the interview sessions was obtained from participants. A process for
semi-structured interview was then carried out.

3.8.3 Focus group session
The study liaison coordinated the sampling and recruitment of the focus
group activity. The recruitment procedures for focus group activity were similar to
that of interviews. Participants to the focus group activity comprised of middlelevel managers. All four groups within the focus of this study were represented by
participants. As suggested by Hennink (2014), the structure of the focus group
activities entailed introduction, opening session, key topics, closing questions,
and a post-discussion session.
During the introduction session, the researcher and participants introduced
themselves to each other for cognition. The aim of the introduction session was
to develop familiarity among participants, between participants and the
researcher, as well as to draw participants’ focus to the study. According to
Hennink (2014), the opening session is vital in building good rapport between the
researcher and participants (Hennink, 2014). As part of the opening session, the
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researcher read an information sheet to participants. The script educated
participants about important aspects pertaining to the study and their
participation. Aspects contained in the script included the purpose of the study,
ethical considerations, and expectations about confidentiality. Permission to
audio-record the session was then obtained verbally from participants and
followed by signed consent forms (Appendix E).
Following introductory remarks were questions that focused on the key
topics and themes of the study (Appendix G). These questions were designed to
explore the common themes and topics identified from the analysis of results
from the interview and survey segments of this study. The focus groups sessions
were meant to provide comprehensive understanding of varying opinions across
the studied groups. The key topics and specific questions segment of the focus
group activities were essential in offering possible explanations to participants’
perceptions of the airline’s safety systems and their safety behavior. This
information may be helpful to further improve the airline’s safety environment.
As suggested by Hennink (2014), the closing questions were aimed to
indicate a near end to a discussion group session. They also help to summarize
items discussed, recap important elements identified during the discussion, and
allow an opportunity for participants to suggest important messages and
recommendation to the management or any other pertinent party.
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3.9

Data Preparation

At the end of data the collection period, the online survey data were
downloaded through a password-secured computer network system. A Microsoft
Excel Spreadsheet was used to eliminate data entries that were incomplete. The
researcher coded the responses with numerical values between and including
one and five. For instance, all ‘Strongly Agree’ responses were coded as a 5, and
all ‘Strongly Disagree’ responses were coded as 1. The study reverses the codes
for questions that were asked in such a manner that, for example, a ‘Strongly
Disagree’ response would have been a more positive response in regard to
safety. Regarding the qualitative segments of this study, the researcher
transcribed interviews and focus group with verbatim for analysis. According to
Hennink (2014), verbatim is integral in presenting qualitative studies, especially
focus group research, and with the thematic data analysis method. The
researcher of the current study did not transcribe individually identifiable data, for
privacy considerations.

3.10 Data Analysis
The researcher for this study used multiple data capture, preparation, and
analysis and presentation methods pertinent to the type of data collected. For
statistical analysis, the researcher used the Statistical Package for the Social
Science (SPSS) version 43, a statistical software program. Reliability of the scale
items were investigated using the Cronbach’s Alpha test. Stevens (2002) and
Fields (2009) recommend a Cronbach’s alpha (α) value of at least .70 as an
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indicator of an adequate internal consistency. Where applicable, a Bonferroni
adjustment was performed to control for inflation of type I error Response
To analyze qualitative data, the researcher of the current study employed a
deductive reasoning approach. Referring to it as a bottom-up reasoning, Trochim
(2006) describes deductive reasoning as one that begins with specific
observations and develops to broader generalities and theories. According to
Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2013), a deductive theory starts with a
researcher reading study transcripts to obtain a general impression of the
responses. Transcripts are re-read one by one, line by line. Coding involves
using a phrase or word to represent the overall message identified in recorded
data such as transcripts, images, and documents (Miles, et al., 2013).
Transcripts were coded based on elements such as repeated words,
phrases, and sentences; statements or ideas stated explicitly as important by
participants; and data that aligned with known pertinent theories and/or concepts.
All the codes were reevaluated, after which some were eliminated and the
remainder joined into groups of common themes. The themes were defined
either purely by what data suggested as well as per elements related to the
research question such as the features of a positive safety culture (Reason, 1997)
and four pillars of SMS (FAA, 2015).

3.11 Validity
This study employed a mixed-method approach to research. Validity is an
important aspect of research. Internal validity concerns aspects that can affect
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the relationship between dependent and independent variables. Regarding
qualitative research, Creswell (2009) defines internal threats as “…experimental
procedures, treatments, or experiences of the participants that threaten
researcher’s ability to draw correct inferences from the data in an experiment” (p.
171). External validity is concerned with aspects that affect the generalizability of
the study results to the population. Threats to external validity occur when “…a
researcher generalizes beyond the groups in the experiment to other racial or
social groups not under the study” (p. 171). Threats to a study’s validity have to
be appropriately addressed (Creswell, 2009).

3.11.1 Threats to Internal Validity
Salkind (2009) identifies seven types of threats to internal validity: history,
selection, regression, mortality, maturation, instrumentation, and testing.
3.11.1.1 History
Studies often take place over a certain duration. Within this time, internal or
external elements may have a variation effect in participants’ responses. For
instance, changes in policies related to the areas of the study may affect how
participants respond to the study. Policies deemed favorable to positive safety
culture may prompt more favorable responses regarding safety culture. This
study limited data collection to 12 weeks to limit the effects of history on the study.
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3.11.1.2 Maturation
Maturation refers to “changes caused by biological or psychological forces”
(Salkind, 2009, p. 232). Maturation is concerned with changes occurring within
participants rather than external factors. For example, a participant may gain full
understanding regarding a particular safety reporting system after a lengthy study.
When the said knowledge is gained within the period of the study, it may
influence the participant’s responses related to the stated safety reporting system
and likely threaten the study’s validity. The current study also limited the data
collection time to help control maturation as an internal threat to the study’s
validity.
Nevertheless, a possible effect of maturation pertaining to the current study
could have been the effect of the change of policy about the Fatigue Risk
Management Program, one of the many safety management programs used by
the subject airline. Data indicate that within the period of the current study, a
policy was instituted by the subject airline’s management to disassociate habitual
citation of pilots’ for Occurrences, pertaining to pilots’ use of the Fatigue
Management Program. The said policy was put into effect after the completion of
the survey and interview phases of the current study, but before the focus group
session. Data also indicates a possible influence of the changes in question, to
focus group participants’ perception of safety culture at the subject airlines.
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3.11.1.3 Selection
Selection refers to the influence that sampling and selection of participants
may have on the results (Salkind, 2009). To reduce selection bias, a random
selection and random assignment have to be performed. This study presented
the survey to the population through online medium to minimize selection bias.
The link to the survey was posted on the subject airline’s Intranet and monthly
safety newsletters. The study assumed the two platforms were accessible by all
employees.
3.11.1.4 Testing
Some aspects of research such as pre-tests can influence participants’
responses during a study (Salkind, 2009). This study did not employ such
techniques. Equally, the researcher limited the number of the subject airline’s
employees that participated in the survey validation process to three, to minimize
testing as a threat to internal validity.
3.11.1.5 Mortality
Mortality refers to attrition of participants before they complete all the
required steps in a study (Salkind, 2009). Studies should be voluntary and
participants should have a right to withdraw at any time they want to do so.
Participants have the right to be informed of these rights. To minimize mortality,
this study presented a survey to participants that was optimized for minimum
length but greatest effect to investigate the research question. There were design
considerations for the survey to be accessed via multiple platforms including
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mobile devices and desktop computers to allow more flexibility to participants.
The survey was designed for an estimated completion time of 10 minutes to
minimize mortality as a threat to validity.
3.11.1.6 Threats to internal qualitative validity
Generally, generalizability is not a significant objective for qualitative
research (Creswell, 2009). Focus group activities and interviews were the
qualitative components of this study. Nevertheless, qualitative research is prone
to other biases that affect validity and need to be addressed. The biases may
include researcher biases such as tone of voice, age, and style of language that
may have influence on participants’ perceptiveness and responses. This study
made efforts to minimize chances of bias in the questions for the focus group
activities and interview sessions towards certain aspects of the study. Some
practices such as leading questions that suggest what the answers should be
may also threaten the validity of the study (Creswell, 2009).
Efforts to promote interval validity in the qualitative parts of the study
included triangulation, as suggested by Cooper (2000). Triangulation refers to
combining “multiple theories, methods, observers, and imperial materials, to
produce a more accurate, comprehensive and objective representation of the
object of study” (Silverman, 2011, p. 32). This study employed a mixed method
approach as well as utilized interview, survey, and focus group as data capture
techniques for triangulation purposes. The researcher also employed external
auditors to check for internal validity as advocated by Creswell (2009). Auditors
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included aviation safety subject matter experts, human factors researchers,
industry professionals, and an employee in the safety department from the
subject airlines. Efforts by external auditors included validation of the study’s
related questions and procedures. Lastly, the researcher provided a detailed
discussion regarding data that was in significant conflict among participants
and/or across the three phases of study (Creswell, 2009).

3.11.2 Threats to External Validity
The four threats to external validity according to Salkind (2009) are
multiple treatment inference, reactive arrangements, pre-test sensitization, and
experimenter effects. These threats affect whether results may be applicable to
other groups. This study considered external threats to validity regarding the
quantitative/survey part of the study.
3.11.2.1 Multiple treatment inference
According to Salkind (2009), participants may be given additional stimuli
or treatment, which may limit generalizability of results to the population or other
groups. Additional treatments should be limited or well accounted for. A section
of the survey solicited an open-ended response from participants. To control for
multiple treatment inference, this question was processed in accordance with
qualitative procedures as explained in the section above. Regarding the semistructured interviews, responses and analysis to the follow-up questions were
identified as well as presented as so.
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3.11.2.2 Reactive arrangements
Salkind (2009) describes reactive arrangements as the change in
participants’ behavior or responses due to the awareness that they are being
watched or observed by researchers. This study did not employ an observation
technique for data collection.
3.11.2.3 Experimenter effects
A researcher may influence, directly or indirectly, a participant’s response
(Salkind, 2009). The researcher made effort to use clear language and a neutral
style of writing on the survey to limit experimenter effect.

3.12 Ethical Consideration
Canella and Lincoln (2011) assert that proper ethical standards should be
at the forefront of all human-centered research. Ethical research may be used as
one of the measurements of a good research plan involving human subject
(Hodges, 2011). The researcher of the current study obtained permission from
the researcher’s institution’s IRB to conduct the current research (Appendix I). In
addition, the researcher observed several measures to safeguard expected
ethical standards.
The researcher de-identified personal identified information from all
captured data, to reduce the possibility of identifying participants, as suggested
by Damianakis and Woodford (2012). The survey used for the current study
instructed participants not to include any personal identifiable information in the
open-ended section of the survey. The researcher did not transcribe personal
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identifiable information while transcribing recorded data from interviews and the
focus group session. Additionally, the analysis and reporting of the current study
was conducted in a manner optimal to participants’ and subject airline’s
confidentiality and anonymity.
Harrison and Rooney (2012) reiterate that human subject have several
rights, including the right “to be properly and adequately informed about the
nature, impact, and outcomes of the research and to consent to participation in
the research” (p. 38). The procedure for the current study included measures to
ensure participants were well informed about the purpose, impacts, and
outcomes of the study, as well as sought informed consent of participation from
student subjects. Interview and focus group participants were presented with
information sheet (Appendix A) that contained information such as the purpose
and implications of the study, as well as expectations regarding participants’’
privacy and confidentiality. The recruitments statements for both phases of the
study contained similar information, as well as an informed consent clause.
Interview and focus group activity participants were also presented with informed
consent forms (Appendix E). The informed consent form contained information
such as the purpose of the study, privacy expectations, and a request to record
the session.
In regard to sampling of participants for participants, the online survey was
accessible through the subject airline’s intranet, which facilitated anonymity and
discouraged participation due to undue influence. While the subject airline’s
study liaison was instrumental in assisting with the process of purposeful
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sampling, participants communicated directly to the researcher concerning any
questions related to the study, as well as to confirm participation. This process
allowed for more participants’ autonomy and voluntariness

3.13 Summary
Chapter 3 explored the methods and methodology adopted in the currently
study. Aspects discussed in the chapter include the research design, study
population, and study sample size. This chapter also discussed the questionnaire
design, methods of data collection, data analysis, survey administration, and
study procedures. Lastly, this chapter explored the study’s validity. The next
chapter will present results from the current study.
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CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the safety culture and safety
climate at a regional airline in the US. The specific questions associated with the
current study were: 1) What are employee perceptions of the safety climate at
the subject airline among and across the target studied groups: pilots,
maintenance technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of
the subject airline?; 2) What are employee perceptions of the four SMS pillars at
the subject airline, among and across the target study groups: pilots,
maintenance technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of
the subject airline?; 3) What are employee perceptions of the safety culture at the
subject airline among and across the target study groups: pilots, maintenance
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the subject
airline?; 4) Are demographic elements such as age, gender, and length of
employment, significant variables of perception of safety climate and/or safety
culture at the subject airline?
The safety climate was analyzed by capturing the subject airline’s
employee perception of safety through an on-line survey. The current study used
a mixed method cross-sectional design. The data acquisition tools used were
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interviews, surveys, and focus group activity. Data were processed and analyzed
according to guidelines stipulated by the researcher. This chapter presents the
results of the study. Qualitative results are presented as common themes
identified from captured data.

4.1

Analysis of Interviews

4.1.1 Demographics Data
This study conducted nine semi-structured interviews. Five participants were
front-line employees. Four were managers. Three of the nine participants were
from the safety department and three were from the group flight attendants. The
categories pilots and maintenance technicians had one participant each. The
remaining participant was from the flight reliability department. Table 6 displays
the breakdown of participants' demographics. Participants’ period of employment
with the subject airline ranged between one and 13 years, with an average of
nine years.

Table 6 A Summary of Interviewees’ Demographics
Job category
Safety
Inflight
Pilot
Maintenance
Total

3
3
2
1
9

Rank
Managers
4
Front-line employees 5

9
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4.1.2 Interview data analysis
This study employed the thematic analysis approach to analyze transcribed
interviews. According to Hennink (2014), thematic analysis is one of the most
common data analysis methods in transcribed data. Thematic analysis allows a
researcher to immerse into data by first breaking data into finer segments. This
process allows for deeper understanding of the relationships raised by
participants from participants’ own perspective. Interview data were transcribed
verbatim as desired by the thematic analysis method, to allow researcher to
effectively use quotations that capture participants’ emotions (Hennink, 2014).
The data were coded and then grouped into common themes and sub-themes.
Themes that strongly mirrored the five elements of safety culture were identified
as such.

4.2

Analysis from Open-ended Segment of Survey

This section pertains to responses from an open-ended question on the
survey that prompted participants to make additional comments regarding safety
at the subject airline. The survey qualitative data were generated by 27
participants who contributed in the additional comment section of the survey, as
illustrated in table 7. Of the 27 participants, 11 were pilots, nine were
maintenance technicians, and three were flight attendants. Two participants from
the group other contributed to the qualitative survey segment as well as one each
from the dispatchers and supervisory-level managers. There was no
representation from middle managers or senior managers in the qualitative
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survey segment. The responses were transcribed, processed, coded, analyzed,
and presented using procedures similar to those employed to analyze the
interview segment of this study.
Table 7 Summary of Demographics of Open-ended Survey Segment
Category
Pilot
Flight attendant
Dispatch
Manager - supervisor
Manager - middle
Manager - senior
Maintenance
Other
Total

4.3

n
11
3
1
1
0
0
9
2
27

Analysis from the Quantitative Segment of the Survey

This study performed internal reliability testing for scale items under all seven
variables in this study. The variables were three of the most common perceptions
related to safety culture (perceived Managements’ commitment to safety,
perceived Employee involvement is safety, and perceived Managements’ actions
regarding safety (Dedobbeleer & Béland, 1991; Flint et al., 2000; Patankar et al.,
2012; Seo et al., 2004; Zohar, 2000)) and the four pillars of SMS (Safety policy,
Safety Assurance, Safety risk management, and Safety promotion (FAA, 2015)).
The last variable, Perception of management, concerned respondents’ view of
management’s efforts towards improving safety at the subject airline. As
suggested by Stevens (2002) the researcher performed a Cronbach’s Alpha test
to ascertain the internal reliability of scale items within all the variables. Stevens
(2002) and Fields (2009) suggest a Cronbach’s alpha (α) value of at least .70 as
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indicator of a high internal consistency. Scale items within each variable ranged
between three and seven as illustrated in Table 8.
Table 8 Summary of Survey Variable Scale Items
Group

Variables

Safety climate perception
elements

Mgmt.'s commitment to safety
Mgmt.'s actions
Employee involvement in Safety

SMS pillars

Safety policy
Safety assurance
Safety risk management
Safety promotion

Scale items
(n)
4
4
3
5
5
4
6

The scale items within all the variables registered Cronbach’s Alpha scores
above .70, indicating internal consistency.

4.3.1 Demographic Information
Table 9 displays a summary of the characteristics of the sample used for
this study. Eighty-nine participants attempted the online survey. Of these, 71
completed the attempted surveys. The researcher excluded incomplete surveys
from analysis of the present study. Forty-six percent (n = 33) of the completed
surveys were from pilots, 23.9 % (n = 17) from maintenance technicians, and
12.7% (n = 9) from the group Others. There were no responses recorded under
the group Management-senior, while the groups Dispatch and Managersupervisor had one response (1.4%), each. Flight attendants and middle
managers constituted nine percent (n = 5) each of total complete responses.
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Due to under-representation of participants in the Manager – supervisor
category, the researcher consolidated this category with the Manager – middle
level category in the analysis and discussion sessions. Additionally, the
researcher excluded the group Dispatch from the quantitative segments of the
current study due to underrepresentation of the group.
Participants were predominantly male (83%, n = 59). The largest age group
range was that of 31 to 40 years (n = 25), followed closely by those in age group
41 to 50 (n = 18). Two respondents recorded their age as over 60 years, while
there were no participants below age 20.
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Table 9 Summary of Participants’ and Groups’ Characteristics
Variable
Years at
current work

<1
1-5
6 - 10
> 10
Total

n
% Cumulative %
16 22.5
22.5
24 33.8
56.3
19 26.8
83.1
12 16.9
100.0
71 100.0

Years worked
with company

<1
1-5
6 - 10
> 10
Total

9 12.7
17 23.9
31 43.7
14 19.7
71 100.0

12.7
36.6
80.3
100.0

21 - 30
31 - 40
41 - 50
51 - 60
> 60
Undisclosed
Total

12 16.9
25 35.2
18 25.4
11 15.5
2
2.8
3
4.2
71 100.0

16.9
52.1
77.5
93.0
95.8
100.0

Male
Female
Undisclosed
Total

59
10
2
71

Age Group

Gender

Job

Categories

83.1
14.1
2.8
100.0

83.1
97.2
100

Pilot
33 46.5
Flight Attendant
5
7.0
Dispatch
1
1.4
Manager-supervisor 1
1.4
Manager-middle
5
7.0
Manager-senior
0
0.0
Other
9 12.7
Maintenance
17 23.9
Total
71 100.0

46.5
53.5
54.9
56.3
63.4
63.4
76.1
100.0
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The largest number of participants (43.7%, n = 31) had worked with the subject
airline for between, and including, six and 10 years. Twelve percent (n = 16) of
participants reported to have worked at the subject airline for less than a year,
the lowest frequency captured by the data.
Regarding years in current position, 33.8% (n = 24) of respondents had
worked between one and five years; while 26.8% (n = 19) had worked between
six to 10 years. Twenty-five percent (n = 16) and 16.9% (n = 12) of respondents
had worked in their current positions for less than a year and for more than 10
years, respectively.
With job-groups as factors, flight attendants recorded to have the largest
number of people who had worked with the subject airlines for the shortest time,
of less than a year (Table 10). This value, for other groups, was between one
and five years. These figures remained similar in regard to time range, under job
category, that employee had worked at employee’s current job. The management
group recorded the highest age category of most participants, considering job
category, of 41 to 50 years. The rest of the groups recorded most participants to
be in age group 31 to 40.

Table 10 Summary of Average Time, in Years
Maintenance
Flight
Attendant Management Technician Other
n
33
5
6
17
9
Age range
31 - 40
31 - 40
41 - 50
31 - 40
31 - 40
Years worked at company
1 - 5 Less than 1
1-5
1-5
1-5
Years worked at current position 1 - 5 Less than 1
1-5
1-5
1-5
Pilots
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4.4

Analysis of the Focus Group activity

The researcher conducted one focus group activity, representing the
middle-level management. There were eight participants in the focus group
session. Table 11 shows the breakdown of participants. The length of the
discussion session was one hour.
Table 11 Summary of Representation of Focus Group Participants
Category
Safety
Flight attendant / Customer service
Flight Operations
Dispatch
Maintenance
Total

4.5

n
3
1
1
1
2
8

Research Question One

What are perceptions of the safety climate at the subject airline among and
across the study groups: pilots, maintenance technicians, dispatchers,
flight attendants, and the management of the subject airline?
The null hypothesis for this question was that there were no significant
differences between the studied groups regarding perception of safety climate at
the subject airline. For this question, the studied groups were the response
variables and participants’ scores, the independent variables. To determine the
appropriate analytical approach relative to applicable assumptions, the
researcher assessed the distribution of data as it pertains to normality, and then
assessed the constant variance of the data.
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The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used where data indicated
symmetry/normal distribution and constant variance, according to Fleiss, Levin,
and Paik (2013). Alternatively, as suggested by Fleiss et al. (2013), the
researcher employed the Welch analysis for data that appeared to be distributed
normally, but without constant variance. The researcher performed a KruskalWallis H test for data that appeared to be asymmetrical but with similar
distribution and constant variance, to determine whether there were any
statistically-significant differences between the studied groups. Noether (2012)
recommends the Kruskal-Wallis for both continuous and ordinal dependent
variables. Advantages the Kruskal-Wallis test has over other statistical analysis
options such as one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) include the disregard for
normality assumption and lowered sensitivity to outliers, as well as its ability to
accommodate ordinal data (Noether, 2012). The researcher used an alpha value
of 0.05, for all calculations, standard in social sciences (Newey & McFadden,
1994), to limit the probability of committing type I error to 5%.
4.5.1 Between-groups safety climate comparison
Test of assumptions for this question indicated skewed distributing among
the groups Maintenance and Other regarding perceived Management’s
commitment to safety. All five elements of safety climate reported p values
above .05, relating to the assessment of homogeneity, indicating constant
variance across the all job categories. The Kruskal-Wallis test investigated
whether any of the studied groups were statistically different in their perceptions
of safety culture at the subject airline. Figure 7 illustrates a statistically significant
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difference among employees with regard to the variable, Management’s
commitment to safety, in the Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric testing.

Figure 7. Between-groups nonparametric safety culture testing
Figure 8 provides evidence that the statistical significant difference observed in
the perception Management’s commitment to safety, is due to significant
difference between maintenance technicians and flight attendants, with a p
value of 0.008, in the pair-wise comparison.

Figure 8. Management’s commitment to safety: Job-group pair-wise comparison.
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To assess whether there were variations among all employees pertaining
to the three perceptions of safety climate considered in the current study, the
researcher first transformed data wide-to-long through the SPSS statistical
software program. The researcher performed a Mixed-model linear assessment.
Table 12 indicates no statistically-significant difference in employee perception,
as a whole, of the three elements of safety climate at the subject airline (ρ = .074)
Table 12 Among Group Safety Climate Test

4.6

Research Question Two

What are employee perceptions of the four SMS pillars at the subject airline,
among and across the target study groups: pilots, maintenance
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the
subject airline?
Statistical procedures for this question were similar to that of question one.
Between-employee perception of the four pillars of SMS. Figure 9 shows results
for cross-group comparison among the studied groups, regarding the four pillars
of safety.

108
Null Hypothesis
1

Test

The distribution of Safety Policy is the
Independent-Samples
same across categories of Job Category. Kruskal-Wallis Test

Sig.

Decision

.033

Reject the null
hypothesis.

The distribution of Safety Assurance is
2 the same across categories of Job
Category.

Independent-Samples
Kruskal-Wallis Test

.017

Reject the null
hypothesis.

The distribution of Safety Risk
3 Management is the same across
categories of Job Category.

Independent-Samples
Kruskal-Wallis Test

.009

Reject the null
hypothesis.

The distribution of Safety Promotion is the Independent-Samples
same across categories of Job Category. Kruskal-Wallis Test

.028

Reject the null
hypothesis.

4

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

Figure 9. Cross-groups SMS pillars comparison
Figure 10 indicates statistical significance across all four pillars of safety culture,
with ρ values ranging from .009 to .028. For pairwise comparison, figure 13
indicates that the significant relationships across the four pillars are due to
differences in perception across all the four pillars between maintenance
technicians and flight attendants (ρ = .019).

Figure 10. Pairwise comparison for the four SMS pillars

Among groups comparison
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Table 14 indicates statistical difference among employees perception of the
four pillars of SMS.
Table 13 Among Group Test

4.7

Research Question Three

What are perceptions of the safety culture at the subject airline among and
across the studied groups: pilots, maintenance technicians, dispatchers,
flight attendants, and the management of the subject airline?
4.7.1 Results of Responses from Interview Sessions
4.7.1.1 Safety Resources
Regarding the general knowledge of safety programs at the subject airline,
of the 11 safety programs identified by participants, seven of the nine participants
indicated they regarded the ASAP program highly, followed by FOQA and the
Fatigue Risk Management Program (FRMP). Two participants indicated a of lack
of clarity regarding the choice of which safety reporting system to use in the
event of a safety incident. “[Referring to IRS and ASAP safety programs] …to be
honest I kinda get the two mixed up sometimes…” one of the two participants
illustrated. All non-safety personnel (six) acknowledged some level of interaction
with safety personnel. The most common interactions with safety personnel
identified by all six non-safety personnel, was in the form of initial training or new-
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hire training and annual re-training, as well as through safety-related publications.
All participants were familiar with safety-related publications, notably, the monthly
safety newsletters and safety memos. All participants also indicated they
received safety education and information through safety training, monthly safety
newsletters, or safety memos.
All flight attendants emphasized the significance that the new-hire training
and the annual re-training contributed to their knowledge of safety, as well as the
positive impact on flight operational safety. In stressing the value of training, a
participant stated“…safety starts literally from initial training… safety is the
primary focus of our training”. Another flight attendant felt that flight attendants
were “trained at the same level of safety as pilots. So, there’s really never a time
when we are not equipped to handle a specific event or emergency”.
4.7.1.2 Perceptions of safety across groups in the subject airline.
Two questions were used to assess participants’ perceptions of the job
categories or departments in the subject airline they regarded as most safe, as
well as job categories or departments they felt were least safe. On the question
concerning the safest departments in the subject organization, three participants
named the pilot group as the safest, while two participants identified the flight
attendant group as the safest. One participant each selected the safety
department and the maintenance group as safest. Regarding the rating of unsafe
groups in the subject airline, four participants proposed the maintenance group
as the least safe, one participant proposed the flight group as the least safe, and
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another participant suggested that all individuals in the organization share equal
responsibility for safety standing.
Some of the reasons provided by participants for selecting the pilot group
as the safest group include the pilots groups good “reporting culture”, length of
time the group has been reporting, greater engagement in safety programs, and
the group’s nature of being the “most cautious”. In addition, two participants
credited their choice of pilots and flight attendants as safety groups to what they
described as the integration of safety-risk management protocols in to the two
groups’ tasks such as by pilots’ use of checklists and standard operating
procedures. Of pilots, a participant explained, “[safety] …it’s just integrated into
everything we do”. The participant added, “The manual if you comply with SOPs
and stuff you’re complying with safety in-built into the manual. Just make sure
that you stay within the safety footprint”.
One participant noted that the difference in the perceived high active-risk
associated with pilots’ and flight attendants’ role compared to perceived lowerrisk with the maintenance group as reason for the participant’s highest and
lowest ratings for the two groups respectively. The participant explained “I think
they [pilots] tend to be more cautious than anybody because they’re flying the
airplane, and they are the one putting passengers and other people directly at
risk. [Of maintenance technicians having a different view] its looks fixed in my
opinion sitting on the ground, [while it would be] a little too much for comfort for
me [crew] because I would be flying a couple of hundred passengers. I think
that’s why crew tend to be more cautious about safety than anybody else”. A
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“historically” relatively better reporting and just cultures environment pilots
operate within, compared to other groups in the organization, was also
mentioned by a participant as an additional reason for cross-groups differences
as it regards to view of safety standing among groups.
4.7.1.3 Perceptions towards Management
While all interview participants portrayed senior management as largely
disengaged from front-line employees, this view contrasted across the various
groups and scenarios. For instance, vice president of safety at the subject airline
was credited by a participant for improving safety at the subject airlines in recent
times “since our VP is here now… …the level of safety is higher than it was”.
Four of the participants attributed the positive feedback regarding progress of
safety at the department, to the supervisory and middle management levels of
leadership. One participant indicated a relatively closer relationship between
middle management and flight crew as one of the reasons the participant viewed
the flight operations department as safest.
Over half of participants cited detachment by senior managers across the
entire organization in the increasing order: the pilot, flight attendant, safety
department, and maintenance technician, respectively. These participants also
indicated the disengagement by the management as one of the major challenges
in the effective promotion of positive safety culture within the organization.
Identified forms of detachment included insufficient physical presence, ineffective
accessibility through phone and/or email, and the level of interest by
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management regarding analysis of safety data. Regarding the need for more
senior management involvement, one participant stated, “getting a sound
audience with executive management… to listen to our concerns because we
see the data like no one else”. Another noted, “Oversight from the maintenance
to management, I don’t think it’s really there, they [senior managers] don’t seem
to be committed to being out on the line, out in the hangar lots of the times”.
Another contribution concludes, “I think for my recommendations would be for
upper management to be open to suggestions”
4.7.1.4 Areas of notable progress
All interview respondents indicated that safety had improved in the recent
past and expressed high hopes of progress regarding safety. This study did not
establish the specific timeline suggested by participants. One participant
expressed his optimism, “I think people want to embrace safety...” “[the]
company came a long way in addressing safety issues” another participant
weighed in. One urged the subject airline not to “stop this train of improvement”,
while another concluded “I think generally as a company we are headed in the
right direction”. One participant however highlighted the challenge that lies ahead
concerning improving safety, “I think we still have a long way to go, but I think it
will take a long time. I think we have a long way to go because we have to let the
old go, the punitive”
Flight attendants indicated that flight attendants at the subject airline were
developing a positive attitude towards, and increasing their participation in the
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ASAP program. They proposed that increased realized value of the ASAP
program and the increased knowledge about the ASAP program, specifically, its
non-punitive nature, as two main reasons for the more positive acceptance of the
ASAP program among flight attendants. Flight attendants cited two benefits as
most important to have been realized by the ASAP program; increased
knowledge about turbulence-related safety issues and increased understanding
of pilot-flight attendant interaction, as it regards to safety. A flight attendant
identified some of the benefits of the improved pilot-flight attendant CRM to
include a more streamlined common safety-related phraseologies, which the
participant alluded to, as having promoted clearer communication between the
two groups. This, the participants alleged, had been critical to improving safety,
particularly related to turbulence “[of improved streamlined phraseology]…and
the injuries a year later show that obviously it worked”, the participant concluded.
Overall, all participants expressed a generally optimistic outlook on safety in
the organization.
4.7.1.5 Areas of potential progress
Safety Reporting
The pilots group was identified by four participants as having the best
reporting and safety cultures. On the other hand, some participants also
expressed the need to improve the two cultures across the entire subject airline.
Data suggested the ASAP program remained largely unpopular among
maintenance technicians, and was still in the “learning curve” among flight
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attendants. Unjust culture, poor reporting culture, and demanding working
conditions such as time pressure, were cited by some participants as among the
main reasons they thought the maintenance technician group was the least safe.
Three participants indicated the Incident Reporting System, a predecessor
to the ASAP program, as the least well-regarded safety reporting program.
Participants pointed out the punitive nature of the Incident Reporting System
program as the main reason for its unpopularity. While all interview participants
demonstrated knowledge of multiple safety reporting programs, two participants
indicated lack of confidence as to which program to use to report an incident,
especially among the non-pilot group.
Fatigue Risk Management Program (FRMP)
There was mixed feedback regarding the FRMP from two participants. One
suggested “Pilot trust in fatigue management program which is getting better…”
However, another participant took a more reserved view “some people complain
about it with our fatigue program… …because if it is a self-induced fatigue and I
think that creates an environment where some people will not call in fatigue
because of fear they may get some sort of discipline action”. The participant
concluded “I think an area of improvement would be on the fatigue part is not
issuing an occurrence to someone if they feel they should not, or are too tired to
fly”. The ‘penalty’, explained the participant, was in the form of an ‘occurrence’.
Another area of improvement as identified by two participants was dealing
with sense of “invincibility” and “complacency” among some flight attendants
regarding their disregard to take appropriate action during occurrences of
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turbulence. “I know what the pilot said, I know there’s going to be turbulence,…
…I have been doing this for a long time, I know what I am doing”, one participant
explained as an illustration of ‘invincibility’ attitude allegedly common among
some flight attendants, following a warning from the cockpit crew pertaining to an
imminent turbulence event. “…that’s the issue we’re battling”, the participant
concludes.
Pressure to complete work in time was highlighted by three participants as
common among maintenance technicians. One participant indicated that
pressure from management is common. Another participant alluded that,
pressure out of the need to keep aircraft flying was just the nature of the job.
Time was limited, the participant explained, due to the limited time an aircraft is
available for maintenance service, number of aircraft that need to be worked on,
and the number of items that each aircraft need to be worked on. One participant
suggested a psychological reason, that in addition, they simply work had
because they “don’t want to put pressure on our passengers, where passengers
are waiting out on the tarmac”.
4.7.2 Results of Responses from the Open-ended Survey Question
4.7.2.1 Results Pertaining to Pilots
Reporting, Informed, and Informed cultures
Eight of the nine participants indicated they viewed the pilot group as very
safety conscious, including healthy reporting and informed cultures. Among the
reasons provided for this viewpoint included a high reporting frequency and
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prevalence of reporting systems such as FOQA, “LOSA”, and ASAP. However,
six pilot participants inferred hesitation among pilots as it pertained to making
fatigue and sick-day calls to what participants cited as “punitive”.

Pilots’ fatigue management program
Comments regarding the subject company’s fatigue management program
included “Fatigue is STILL a big deal”, “I don't feel our fatigue or sick call policies
are in the best interest of safety”, and “Fatigue policy can be punitive and crews
are always expected to extend part 117 duty times…” One participant indicated
that fatigue calls are generally not well received by the management and/or the
scheduling department. The participant expressed “Call in fatigued, and you will
most certainly get some attitude from the company at some level. When was the
last time that the company pulled crewmembers pre-emptively for likely being
fatigued?” One participant suggests that fatigue is “not taken seriously” because
it is “less easily quantifiable safety issues” and its effects “hard to measure”.
Cost and productivity versus safety
Data suggested a consensus that productivity and cost effectiveness were
more important than safety. One participant argues that aircraft and passenger
safety are usually a priority but adds, “However there are times where a pilot on
the verge of a fatigue call, or telling or asking crew scheduling about his/her duty
limitations are, where safety is dropped for completing the flight”. Another
participant warned, “Do not allow money to be the deciding factor when it relates
to safety, but that's all this company cares about is money”. A pilot participant
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adds “The idea that it is normal, or acceptable to deviate from the FOM/GOM,
SOP, or FAM as a matter of routine should be seen as a major failure of the
safety culture at “deleted”[subject airline], but it is accepted by management
because it doesn't hurt their bottom line”. Sentiments towards this position were
also more pronounced among responses from maintenance technicians. These
sentiments included “accomplishment is still the priority, not safety” and “I have
witnessed mechanics, supervisors, inspectors, managers, and directors all ignore
safety in lieu of production goals”. The researcher was unable to substantiate
these claims.
Routine safety violations
While there was a strong consensus that there was habitual disregard for
safety across the subject organization, data also indicated specific routine safety
violations. One of the stronger comments was that subject airline had “fostered” a
“the culture of noncompliance” and “encouraged” “deviations. For instance, a
participant claimed, “99% of flights depart with the same violation of SOP
‘dropping the brake’". Another mentioned the health and safety concerns posed
by excessive dust from sanding and grinding works. According to the participant,
as the sanding and grinding machines have safety guards and dust covers
removed, employees were exposed to excessive dust, which makes it difficult for
the sanders to have a clear view of the tools, hence heightening hazards. One
participant alludes to policies and manual that “cannot be reasonably complied
with” as reason for noncompliance. The participant explains “The idea that it is
normal, or acceptable to deviate from the FOM/GOM, SOP, or FAM as a matter
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of routine should be seen as a major failure of the safety culture at [subject
airline]”. The researcher was unable to verify the stated claims.
Other safety concerns mentioned by participants included alleged
incidences of “very” inexperienced pilots flying the “left seat” so they could attain
100 hours, usually at the expense of more experienced captain, and well as
overreliance on two captains crews when a first officer in not available, a moved
indicated by the participant as prohibited by other airlines.
4.7.2.2 Maintenance Technicians
Productivity versus safety
Similar to pilots’ expression, many maintenance technicians felt the subject
airline prioritized productivity more than safety. Data portrayed unlearning and
inflexible cultures as dominant within the maintenance community. The
systematic ignorance of safety concerns was described as prevailing among all
levels of employees including maintenance technicians, supervisors, inspectors,
managers, and directors. Data also suggested that safety policies only for “show”
and not “enforced”. One participant described managers as “bully” towards
frontline employee when safety “issues are brought up”.
Other notable concerns
A participant indicated safety concerns regarding employees who were
physically handicapped, in the event of an emergency. The participant did not
identify the specific safety hazards but suggested relocating employees in
question to the first floor, would mitigate the implied hazards.
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Another safety concern pertained to maintenance technicians, and
addressed the manner in which aircraft were habitually staged while undergoing
maintenance procedures. Often, technicians worked under and around an aircraft
that is supported on a single bottle jack with both bottle wheels; this, despite the
lack of a safety stand, which should be in place in case the jack should fail,
topple, or punch through the floor, as has supposedly happened, multiple times.
4.7.2.3 Flight Attendants
A flight attendant felt pilots were “very” safety minded and that “most” flight
attendants did not “comprehend the hidden safety issues impacting, or affected
by… [their]… job and/or actions”. “The general lack of job happiness is
ubiquitous with both the flight deck crew and cabin crew” added another, and as
such, the participant “hardly” sees “anyone going the extra mile to do their jobs
above and beyond just the bare minimum to not get fired”. A third respondent
identified the galley cart as the main hazard among flight attendants’ job during
flights. The flight attendant linked the hazard to the carts’ movement, weight, and
size, recommending research into the use of ‘half carts’.
4.7.2.4 Other
A participant from the group Other suggested that safety is promoted less
by the subject airline to employees who do not work directly on aircraft. “The
company only hears what it wants to hear”, wrote another participant. The
participant added that employee safety reporting was low because of a punitive
approach by the subject airline.
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4.7.3 Results of Responses from Focus Group Activity
The purpose of the focus group activity was to gain deeper understanding
of common themes identified from the survey and interview segments of this
study. From the thematic analysis of the transcribed data, the researcher
identified eight common themes. The themes included safety-operations balance,
communication, the ASAP program, and discrepancies in reporting across
groups. Other themes developed from the data were feedback, fatigue
management program, crew resource management, and possible areas of safety
concerns.
4.7.3.1 Safety versus operation/business balance
Four participants identified that decisions regarding the balance between
safety and business interests were the most significant and frequent challenge
they faced. “It’s always challenging to balance safety versus operations” noted
one participant, as another confirmed, “I would second what the commenter has
just said, that, it is always a balance between safety and operations”. Among
reasons proposed by some of the participants as contributing to the challenge in
maintaining the balance, include the faster pace of expansion of the subject
airline, concerning employee size, size of operations, and greater geographical
reach.
4.7.3.2 Communication
Data suggested an overall poor communication throughout across all
departments and hierarchies of the subject airline. A participant suggested
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communication efficiency has not kept up with the rate of expansion of the airline.
Another participant suggested that the expansion of the airlines had increased
vertical separation between employee hierarchies and had also affected
communication between the hierarchies negatively. The geographical expansion
of the subject airline was also cited as a factor of poor communication by a
participant. Yet another participant suggested the fast pace of growth, rather than
the growth itself was a negative variable to effective communication. Elements
cited by some participants as most susceptible to poor communication included
safety-specific information, time sensitive information, and bottom-up
communication.
4.7.3.3 ASAP program
Responses to the ASAP program was overwhelmingly positive and
optimistic among all participants. The program was cited by all participants as
vital to identifying safety issues and prompting relevant solutions for the identified
safety issues. In addition to safety related data, a participant reasoned that other
benefits included information useful for personnel management, regulations, and
financial decisions. Two participants agreed that the ASAP program working in
tandem with the FOQA program provides a basis for a robust safety
management system. However, one comment suggested the program was
relatively new among maintenance technicians and another suggested it was
reaching maturity among flight attendants.
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4.7.3.4 Discrepancies in incident reporting across studied groups
Various reasons were given by participants for the differences in reporting
culture across groups in subject airline, as suggested by results from interviews
and survey. Three participants argued that safety issues related to flight
attendant and pilots tended to be more definitive, compared to those experienced
by maintenance technicians, hence were likely to be reported by the former
groups. Two participants cited that often, mistakes or errors made by flight
attendants and/or pilots were likely to be noted and/or reported by external
groups such as air traffic controllers or data programs such as FOQA. This factor,
the participant argued, compels pilots and flight attendants to report safety
incidents, compared to the maintenance personnel who, according to the
participant’s view exercised a more flexible discretion. Pilots in particular, a
respondent added, were motivated to report incidents by the ASAP’s program
element that protected their licenses when they reported correctly and qualified
for the inferred protection. Another comment suggested that quicker feedback
encouraged reporting from pilots. Yet, another proposed that pilots, by nature,
felt personal obligation to report incidents that they thought would be helpful to
other pilots and the company.
Numerous reasons were proposed by several participants for the weak
reporting culture. One suggested that maintenance technicians “just aren’t as
comfortable” reporting. Two participants contend that, by nature, humans are
slow to change, and given the ASAP program was relatively new among
maintenance technicians (compared to the pilot group), reporting was likely to
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improve with time. As an example, the participants drew comparison to the fact
that trust was now fully developed among pilots as it regards to the ASAP
program, partly due to the length of time the ASAP program had been in place
among pilots. The two participants also related the still growing trust among pilots
concerning the FOQA and fatigue management programs, as well as among
flight attendants, in regard to the ASAP program. Additionally, lack of quick
feedback, three participants proposed, may have created a sense that incident
reporting was not valuable, hence unnecessary, to employees exhibit low
incident reporting.
4.7.3.5 Fatigue management program
“The fatigue program is really tough… I think a lot people were probably
flying fatigued”, noted a participant, but added that the program had undergone
some changes since the researcher of the current study had completed the
interview and survey segments of the current study. A contentious element,
continued the participant, had been regular accrual of “occurrences” to pilots’
records following some fatigue-calls, which, according to the participant, pilots
largely viewed as punitive. Two participants discussed and disagreed about
whether “occurrences’ on one’s record constituted something negative or
otherwise. A major change that had been done to the fatigue management
program, explained another participant, was the removal of ‘occurrences’ from all
fatigue-calls, and that, as a result, fatigue-calls had increased. The second
contributor mentioned that there had been concerns of individuals abusing the
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program. However, the participant continued, improved education about the
program had resulted in the program being abused less. The first contributor to
this theme warned that lack of same level of privacy and anonymity expectations
associated with other safety programs such as ASAP remained a challenge to
overcome regarding the fatigue management program. Nevertheless, the
participant suggested that more changes to improve the program should be
expected.
4.7.3.6 Crew resource management (CRM)
Participants identified several employee relationships across the groups
that affected their performance as well as safety considerations. These
relationships included the executive versus middle management versus front-line
employee; pilot versus flight attendant; pilot and flight attendant versus senior
management; and pilot vs dispatch.
One participant proposed that whereas there were CRM issues between
pilots and flight attendants, often, the two groups are agreeable to some of the
issue, but the groups would often be pitted against the management, in respect
to the specific issues they would have agreed on. “[Regarding differing
management’s views]…the management think it’s a whole different situation,
they have a different perspective”, a participant elaborated. A case in point, the
participant added, was lack of guidance from the management concerning
differing emergency guidelines between the two groups. Regarding pilots and
dispatchers relationship, a participant explained that it is often lack of effective
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communication that may lead to misunderstanding and mistrust between the two
groups. For example, a new fuel procedure that is communicated to one group
and not the other, may cause confusion to the uninformed group, stated the
participant. Poor communication, believed four participants, was the main reason
of sometimes-poor relationship between the airline’s hierarchies levels, often
leaving middle managers feeling “stuck” in the middle.
4.7.3.7 Suggested possible areas of improvement
While poor communication was cited by majority (five) of participants as a
chronic issue company-wide, one participant expressed liking improvements
related to communication. Another participant cited pro-activeness in risk
assessment before implementing new policies and procedures as positive
elements, while another participant acknowledged the important role played by
the union as pertains to improving safety.
Some elements were identified by a few participants as priority-areas, as it
relates to safety culture. A participant was concerned with the low rates of
incident reporting among maintenance technicians. The participant suggested
increased feedback to maintenance technicians would help to improve reporting
and expressed optimism that reporting culture would improve as employees
become more familiar with and gain comfort with the ASAP program. Another
participant hoped management would engage more to improve CRM between
pilots and flight attendants, and between pilot-flight attendant unison and senior
managers. The participant indicated that most of the issues presented at a safety
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infoshare seminar earlier in the year, had yet to be addressed. Also, concerning
flight attendants, a participant reiterated that although benefits of the ASAP
program had been apparent, an additional major challenge they are still to
overcome is the tendency of some flight attendants to keep working, serving
customers during events of turbulence because “they think they’re going to get in
trouble” despite of assurances from the management.
Two participants suggested that more work be done in the area of
automation. Concerns related to automation included improper use, over-reliance,
and loss of proficiency in hand-flying of aircraft. A concern related to the dispatch
group was low experience due to high employee turnover rates.

4.8

Research Question Four

Are demographic elements such as age, gender, and length of employment,
significant variables of perception of safety climate at the subject airline?
Statistical procedures for this question were similar to that of questions
one and two. To answer question four, the researcher used Kruskal-Wallis H
nonparametric tests to determine whether the dependent variables under
investigation were statistically different. The researcher used an alpha value
of .05 to limit type I error to 5%. A Bonferroni adjustment was used where
necessary to adjust the ρ value for more accurate results.
4.8.1 Results of age-group as a variable of safety climate
Results for testing age groups as independent variables of safety climate
indicated statistically-significant differences in perceived Management’s
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commitment to safety and perceived Employee involvement in safety (figure 11).
Figure 12 shows the results of pairwise comparison among the age groups. For
pair-wise comparison, age group was not a statistically significant factor in of
Management’s commitment to safety.

Figure 11. Age group as a variable of safety culture

Figure 12. Age-group pairwise comparison – perceived employee
participation in safety
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4.8.2 Results of the assessment of the number of years of employment with
company as a variable of safety climate
Number of years individuals had worked at a company appeared to
influence participants’ perception of Management’s commitment to safety and
Management’s actions (figures 13, 14, and 15).

Figure 13. Number of years of employment with airline

Figure 14. Management Action: Pair-wise comparison of categories of the number of
years exmployees had worked with company
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Figure 15. Management’s commitment to safety: Pair-wise comparison of categories of
the number of years exmployees had worked with company.

4.8.3 Results of the number of years employee had worked at current job as a
variable of safety climate
As shown in figure 16, there were no statistically-significant scores in the
Kruskal-Wallis Test - all pair-wise comparisons, to suggest age category, in years,
that survey participants had worked at their current jobs, was a variable in
perceptions of safety culture at the subject airline.
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Figure 16. Number of years woked at current job

4.8.4 Results of gender as a variable of safety climate
Testing for gender as a significant variable of Safety culture rejected the null
hypothesis, indicating gender was as a statistically-significant factor of
Management’s commitment to safety at ρ = .025 (figure 17), with females having
a higher perception compared to male (figure 18).

Figure 17. Age group as variable of safety culture
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Figure 18. Age pairwise comparison

4.8.5 Results of perception towards management
As shown by figure 19, data did not indicate statistical significance across the
groups on the groups’ view of management’s commitment towards enhancing
safety at the subject airline.

Null Hypothesis

Test

Sig.

Decision

The distribution of Perception
Independent-Samples
Retain the null
.171
towards Management is the same
Kruskal-Wallis Test
hypothesis.
across categories of Job.
Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

Figure 19. Perception of management’s commitment to safety

4.8.6 Results of groups’ average safety score
The survey asked participants to provide a score, of between 1 and 10, 10
being the highest, of their rating of safety culture at the subject airline. The mean
score among all participants was 6.5. Tests indicated data met assumptions for
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homogeneity (F = .52, ρ = .71), but not normality. With a ρ value of .323 (figure
20), the Kruskal-Wallis result indicates there was no significant difference
between employee groups regarding perception of the average safety score at
the subject airline.
Null Hypothesis

Test

The distribution of Average
safety score is the same
1
across categories of Job
Category.

IndependentSamples KruskalWallis Test

Sig.

Decision

.323

Retain the null
hypothesis.

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

Figure 20. Job category as variable for safety score
4.8.7 Results of employee perception of management’s commitment to safety
Regarding responses on employee view of management’s commitment to
safety at the subject airline, data (figure 21) indicates there was job category was
not a significant factor of employee perception of management’s commitment to
safety at the subject airline.

Null Hypothesis

Test

The distribution of employee
perception of Mgmt. is the
1
same across categories of
Job.

IndependentSamples KruskalWallis Test

Sig.

Decision

.114

Retain the null
hypothesis.

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

Figure 21. Employee perception of management’s commitment to safety
4.9

Summary of Findings

The purpose of the current study was to assess employee perception of the
safety culture, safety climate, and four pillars of SMS at a regional airline. Front
line employee groups pilots, maintenance technicians, flight attendants,
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dispatchers, and managers participated in this study. The specific objectives of
the current study were to answer the following research questions:
1. What are employee perceptions of the safety climate at the subject airline
among and across the target study groups: pilots, maintenance
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the
subject airline?
2. What are employee perceptions of the four SMS pillars at the subject
airline, among and across the target study groups: pilots, maintenance
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the
subject airline?
3. What are employee perceptions of the safety culture at the subject airline
among and across the target study groups: pilots, maintenance
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants, and the management of the
subject airline?
4. Are demographic elements such as age, gender, and length of
employment, significant variables of perception of safety climate and/or
safety culture at the subject airline?
The current study used a mixed method and cross-sessional design to
investigate the research questions. The researcher collected data through
interview, focus group, and online survey. The focus group session intended to
gain further understanding of responses from the online survey and the interview
segments of the current. Results indicate flight attendants perceived Just and
Learning cultures significantly higher than maintenance technicians did. Similarly,
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data suggests flight attendants had a higher perception of all the pillars of SMS
than maintenance technicians did. Result of the current study failed to dispute
the null hypothesis that there was no difference among all employees concerning
their perception of the five elements of safety culture.
Regarding safety culture, data indicates a significant prominence and value
of the ASAP program. Employee responses suggest data reporting may be
correlated to a number of variables such as perceived risk, ability for a third party
to be knowledgeable about an incident in question, desire to protect oneself from
litigation, perceived value, and level of just/unjust culture.
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Chapter four provided the analysis and results of the study. This chapter
will provide a summary of the current study. It will discuss the results of the
present study, suggest possible implications of current study, address the study’s
limitations, and offer recommendations. This chapter will end with conclusions to
the present study.

5.1

Summary of Findings

The purpose of the present study was to assess the safety culture and
safety climate at a regional airline. The target population was pilots, maintenance
technicians, flight attendants, dispatchers, and managers of the subject airline.
The study also evaluated participants’ perception of the subject airline’s SMS.
This chapter provides the results and analysis of the mixed method approach
that utilized three data capturing techniques in the current study: interview, focus
group activity, and online survey. The researcher applied appropriate data
analysis techniques including thematic approach within inductive reasoning and
inferential statistics to answer the research questions.
The first research question investigated whether there were variations in
employee perception of the safety climate among and between studied groups,
at the subject airline. Data from participants’ responses from the quantitative
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segment of the online safety climate survey was used to investigate this question.
Results suggest that flight attendants regarded Management’s commitment to
safety higher than maintenance technicians did, at the subject airline. Data did
not indicate a significant difference among all participants in this area.
The second research question investigated whether there were variations
in employee perception of the four pillars of SMS among and between studied
groups at the subject airline. The researcher used participants’ responses from
the quantitative segment of the online survey to investigate this question. Results
indicate a significant difference among participants regarding the four pillars of
SMS. Results also indicate flight attendants’ perception of all the four pillars of
SMS was significantly positive compared to that of maintenance technicians.
The third research question investigated whether there were variations in
employee perception of the safety culture among and between studied groups, at
the subject airline. The researcher used all three data capturing techniques:
interview, open-ended segment of the online safety climate survey, and the focus
group activity, to answer this research question. Data from the three sources
indicated the ASAP program was largely successful or promising at the subject
airline. In addition to observations such as relatively positive reporting and just
cultures among pilots and flight attendants; other notable observation by the data
include, the new-hire training and annual retraining activities were critical to
safety training; and the monthly safety newsletter and memos were identified as
the most accessible safety publications. Elements unfavorable to safety, as
indicated by the data, included management being out-of-touch with employees,
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poor communication across the subject airline, a weak reporting culture among
maintenance technicians, cases of some flight attendants not adhering to proper
responses during turbulence events, and pilots’ reluctance to using the fatigue
management program.
The fourth research question investigated demographic variables as factors
influencing perception of safety climate at the subject airline. The researcher of
the current study used data from the online safety climate survey to investigate
this question. Results indicated that the age, gender, and length of time an
employee had worked with the subject airline were factors, which influenced the
workers’ perception of safety climate. Data did not support the hypothesis that
the number of years an employee had worked at their current job was a factor
affecting perception of safety climate. Equally, data did not show that job-group
was a significant factor in employee perception of management’s commitment to
safety at the subject airline. Table 14 shows a summary of all study participants’
top five overall perceptions, negative as well as positive responses, regarding
safety culture and safety climate at the subject airline according to the researcher.
Table 14 Aggregated Participants’ Perceptions
Positive perceptions
Safety progress & optimism
ASAP- most successful safety program
Pilot - safest group
Safety training is effective
Safety publications

Negative perceptions
Management out of touch
Poor communication feedback
Maint. Tech - least safe group
Safety sacrificed for productivity
Non-compliance culture
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5.2

Discussion

SMS is a top-down comprehensive method of managing organizational
safety (GAO, 2012; ICAO, 2009). The collection of the quantity and quality of
data is increasingly becoming significant to safety (GAO, 2012), especially to
efforts to shift the approach to safety towards a predictive approach, which is
enshrined in SMS (FAA, 2015). The purpose of SMS is to reduce risks to
acceptable levels (Ayres et al., 2009) and to attain a dynamic organizational
safety culture that nurtures positive safety behavior such as safety reporting
(Rose, 2006). FAA (2015) states that while the Safety risk Management and
Safety assurance are the most important of the four SMS pillars, safety culture is
a critical variable of success of any safety program. The proper understanding of
safety culture by leaders in the aviation industry and by other aviation safety
stakeholders has the potential to improve aviation operational safety (von
Thaden, 2008). The current study assessed safety climate, culture, and
employee perception of SMS at the subject airline, all vital elements of a robust
operational safety.
Several results in the current study mirror results observed from other
scholarly works. The current study suggests that employee incident reporting is
motivated by positive and negative stimuli. Positive stimuli identified by the study
included pilots’ inherent pro-activeness to safety, a more active-hazard
environment (as it regards to pilots and maintenance technicians, and just culture.
Negative stimuli included the need to protect pilots’ license, ambiguity in what
constitutes an unsafe and reportable event (in the case among maintenance
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technicians), an inherent low desire to report, and an environment of unjust or
blame culture (also as indicated by data to be the case among some
maintenance technicians). The stated outcomes of the current study mirror
observation some observations by other researchers in related studies (Adjekum
et al., 2015; Cooper, 2001; Cox & Cox, 1991; FAA, 2014; GAIN Working Group,
2004; and Hudson, 2001b.)
The seemingly overwhelming success of the ASAP program, particularly
among flight attendants, may help explain why flight attendants seemed to
perceive safety climate, safety culture, and Management’s commitment to safety,
more positively than maintenance technicians did. Researchers (Shappell &
Wiegmann’s, 2000; Tsay et a, 2014) have addressed the importance of the role
of senior managers plays in the success of safety programs, including
formulations of effective safety policies and safety promotion strategies. It is
possible that flight attendants felt that the managers played a significant roles in
what flight attendants portrayed as success with the ASAP program, including its
effective promotion as well as adhering to the significant non-punitive aspect of
the program. The two “important” practical applications (pilot-flight attendant
improved CRM and turbulence-related safety improvements) indicated by
respondents as resulting from the ASAP program, may have also give an
impression of management’s involvement in terms of feedback and other
systematic support regarding flight attendants. This is in stark contrast to
maintenance technicians, whom, as data indicates, the management was most
out-of-touch with, in addition to being subjected to the most blame culture.
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However, as there were no significant differences among all responses as a
group in regards to safety climate, and that some elements of safety culture such
as senior management being “out-of-touch” with employees, may underline
common or systematic latent organizations negative aspects of safety. The
difference between flight attendants and maintenance technicians in reference to
just culture, learning culture, the four pillars of SMS, and perception of the
general safety culture. Four out of five flight attendants who responded to the
safety climate survey were female. Across all the three segments of the present
study, flight attendants responded overwhelmingly positively regarding the ASAP
program, including valuable feedback, just culture, and practical changes as a
result. This is in line with previous research that suggests factors such as
effective feedback, communication, and just cultures positively affect safer
practices (Liou et al., 2008; Reason, 1998).
While participants suggested, regarding safety climate, that pilots were best
at safety reporting, data suggests that flight attendants perception of safety
culture was most contrasting with that of maintenance technicians, whose
perception of the same was least positive. A possible explanation, as indicated
by data from the current study, is that flight attendants’ positive responses could
be influenced by the fairly new success the group had experienced with the
ASAP safety program. In contrast, for example, the group pilot was perceived as
safest and had had longer experiences with safety programs such as ASAP,
except for the fatigue management program, but did not register statistically
significant difference in perceptions of safety climate from any other group
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studied. Additionally, as indicated by data, flight attendants also scored well in
safety culture, but were more likely to report incidents purely for safety promotion
and safety risk management reasons. Pilots, on the other hand, may have more
reasons to report incidents, such as protection of their licenses or the ability of
another department, such as air traffic control, to report the same incident. It can
however argued that, regardless of the reasons for reporting the incidents,
increased reporting is better than no or under-reporting. An element of interest,
and of possible research interest, could be the quality of reporting based of the
reason for reporting. Stolzer (2011) lists possible limitations of human reporting
systems as non-reporting and partial or false reporting and suggests automatic
data transmission system as a possible remedy to these limitations.
The study indicated no significant difference in perception of safety climate
among job categories; perception of safety climate, given the number of years an
employee had worked at employee’s current job; safety rating, given the job type;
and perception of management’s commitment to safety, given the a job category.
Possible reasons for these observations could be explained by a series of
underlying similarities in qualitative responses among respondents, whether
positive or negative. Positive underlying responses include a general perception
that safety has improved much in ‘recent times’, a general positive outlook on
safety at the subject airline, the role played by the safety team, and an
overwhelming positive regard for the ASAP safety program. Negative similarities
include the perception of the management as out of touch from front line
employees; poor communication and or feedback between all employee
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hierarchies; unjust culture; and perception of management’s prioritization of
productivity over safety.
Participants who had worked at the airline between, and including, six to 10
years appeared to perceive managers as more committed to safety, and that
managers actions were more favorable to promoting safety, than participants two
had worked at the airline for less than a year did. It is possible that participants
who had worked at the organization longer were older, more experienced hence
had a clearer understanding of work-related risks, and perceive risk differently
than those how had worked at the company for less than a year. This
observation can also be explained by the lack of sufficient evidence to suggest
that the length of time an employee had worked at employee’s current job, was a
factor of perception of safety culture and safety climate, and that age was a
factor of the same. Adjekum et al. (2015) suggests that age is factor or safety
reporting possibly due to perception of reportable risk. However, it is interesting,
that with the current study, regarding perceived employee involvement in safety,
the difference is between adjacent age groups 41-50 and 51-60. It is possible
that this observation is purely coincidental, related to statistically significant
different responses based on job category such as maintenance and flight
attendant, or yet, subject to other confounding factors otherwise not addressed in
or by the current data.
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5.3

Limitations

The current study experienced a number of limitations. The sample size for
the online survey (n = 71) was lower than the researcher had anticipated
(approximately n = 200). Equally, some sub-groups of the study, such as senior
management, received low or zero representation on the survey segment of the
current study. According to Newey and McFadden (1994), sample size can affect
type I error. To limit the effect of a smaller sample size, the current study
employed the Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric H test where applicable. While the
smaller sample size also limits the generalizability of the current findings, the
results provide valuable information to the researcher, the subject airline, aviation
safety stakeholders, and other researchers.
A second limitation of the current study was the use of one focus group
session. The researcher had originally designed to hold two focus group activities,
one comprising front line employee, the other, the management team. Financial,
operational, and organizational changes that took place in the subject airline
within the period of the current study created a challenging environment to hold a
frontline-employee focus group activity.
Participation from the group Dispatch was relatively low, which affected the
assessment of the group in this study. Participation to the current study was
anonymous and confidential. As such, the researcher was limited regarding
follow-up efforts related to the study, such as member checking.
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5.4

Recommendations

Data from the current investigation assessed the relevant research
questions, but also raised new areas of potential interest.
5.4.1 Recommendations for Practice
Limitations of the current study restrict generalizability of the study findings.
Nevertheless, the findings can still provide some insight into the dynamics of
airline safety environment as well as important lessons. Based on the current
study’s findings, strategic planning in an organization’s expansion, operationally
or geographically, should include measures that ensure a sustained and efficient
communication standard across all employee hierarchies, to a level that
maintains a positive safety environment.
The current study indicated that just culture; perceived risk; and effective
and timely feedback regarding incidents reported; were among the vital factors to
reporting culture. These values and elements should be constantly nurtured.
Nevertheless, where these elements are in play, effective employee education as
it pertains to new and existing safety reporting programs, as well as appropriate
motivation and interventions to use these programs, are vital measures to
promote an effective safety reporting culture. A case in point was the role that
just culture, employee education, and valuable feedback appeared to have in
rapidly building trust and acceptance of the ASAP program among flight
attendants. New programs need constant reevaluation and necessary changes
effected, as appears to be the case for pilots’ experience pertaining to the fatigue
management program.
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As safety culture and safety climate are dynamic (Taylor, 2012), as well as
due to limitations associated with qualitative and cross-sectional studies
(Creswell, 2009) safety culture and safety climate studies should be conducted
as frequently as practical. Specific issue suggested by participants, particularly
those that appear critical and not substantiated by the researcher or participants
such as cited routine violations, be investigated further, accordingly, by the study
subject organizations.
5.4.2 Recommendation for future Research
The researcher of the current study recommends the following items for
future research. The current study is cross-sectional in design. One of the
limitations of a cross-sectional study is that it provides only a snapshot of a
situation in time (Creswell, 2009). A longitudinal design study would allow for
investigating trends and would provide relevant consistent mitigations that may
be particularly important and in tandem with the dynamic nature of organizational
culture.
The researcher of the current study recommends future work to include at
least three focus groups that target each of the group segments, frontline
employees, middle-level managers, and executive/senior managers. This
approach would promote equal representation of all hierarchies and may gather
comprehensive data related to the study for more accurate analyses.
While the present study identified many variables of safety climate and
safety culture, the researcher recommends further research in mitigating
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psychological variables. An example of a positive psychological variable of safety
reporting identified by the current study was the inherent desire by some
participants to provide information useful to other employees and the
organization. However, of particular concern to the researcher of the current
study were two behaviors. The first pertains to the fear, among some flight
attendants, of receiving negative feedback from passengers or “getting in trouble”,
which prompted them to keep serving passengers through occurrences of
turbulence, this, despite the assurance of support from the subject airline’s
management. Similarly, some responses suggested that maintenance
technicians, among other motivation of a negative safety culture and climate, was
the strong sense of owing the passenger a timely flight.

5.5

Conclusions

Safety is vital in the aviation industry. Airlines are expected to implement
SMS by the year 2018 (FAA, 2015b). The success of the SMS, a comprehensive
safety management program that allows for a positive safety standing in an
organization (GAO, 2012; ICAO, 2009) is highly reliant on the prevailing
organizational safety environment (FAA, 2015). Safety climate allows for the
capture of employee “…attitudes, opinions and feelings towards safety, and its
management within the organization” (HSE, 2005, p. 16). Knowledge about
employee perception of SMS, safety culture, and safety climate, is essential in
establishing a sustained safe operational environment. The current study
investigated these three elements at the regional airline.
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Research finding suggests no significant differences among respondents
regarding safety culture, but that, flight attendants perceive Just and Learning
cultures more positively that maintenance technicians, when the studied groups
were compared, as well as management’s commitment to safety. Additionally,
time participants had worked at the subject airline appeared to be a variable in
perception of safety climate.
The findings also suggests that employees perceived the ASAP safety
program very positively and had an optimistic view of safety at the subject airline.
Limitations of this study included small sample sizes for survey participants and
the inability to conduct a frontline-employee focus group activity.
Among the researcher’s recommendations for application and for future
research included better promotion and evaluation of safety programs;
investigation of psychological variables of safety behavior; and suggested
carrying out longitudinal studies. Additionally, the researcher recommended
further investigation into all allegations of routine violations identified in such
studies by subject organizations.
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Appendix A Participant Information Sheet

For IRB Use Only

RESEARCH PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET
Perception of Safety Culture at a Regional Airline
Dr. Richard Fanjoy - Principal Investigator
Mr. Micah Walala – Co-investigator
School of Aviation and Transportation Technology
Purdue University

Your opinion about the safety climate at “deleted” is important in the continual
improvement of safety in the aviation industry. The purpose of this study is to
attempt to assess the perception of front line operational personnel such as pilots,
dispatch, and maintenance personnel, as well as management’s opinion of the
status of the safety culture at a regional airline. Understanding safety perceptions
will assist regional airlines in making continuous safety improvements to all
aspects of its operations. My name is Micah Walala, a student from Purdue
University in the School of Aviation and Transportation Technology, working
closely with Dr. Richard Fanjoy, the Principal Investigator. You are eligible to
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participate in this study because you are an employee of “deleted” [subject airline]
or its subsidiary, and are at least 18 years old.

Since answers are to remain anonymous, PLEASE DO NOT PUT YOUR NAME
ON THIS SURVEY. Results will be reported for the group of respondents as a
whole to further ensure your anonymity. Furthermore, only the investigators will
have access to the survey data. “Deleted” [subject airline] will be furnished with
the final report that will not contain any personal identifiable data.

If you decide to participate in this study, you will take part in one, two, or three of
the following study phases: survey, interview, and focus group activities. The
questions in all three phases are designed to determine how you perceive the
safety culture in your organization.

Survey: - You are asked to answer a short questionnaire of 20 questions with five
point Likert-scale about your perception of aviation safety culture in your
organization. The survey includes one open-ended essay style question. The
survey will take approximately 10 minutes, and will be conducted on-line with a
title ‘Safety Culture Survey’. The survey also asks you to identify some of your
demographic information such as age and length of time you have worked at
your current position.
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Interview: - You are asked a set of questions about your perception of safety
culture in your organization. The interview is designed to last for approximately
30 minutes. With your permission, the interview will be audio recorded. The
recording is only for purpose of the research. Only Dr. Fanjoy and I will listen to
the recording.

Focus group activity: - A set of questions and topic will be introduced for your
opinion and discussion. With your permission, the session will be audio recorded.
The recording is only for purpose of the research. Only Dr. Fanjoy and I will listen
to the recording. The focus group session will last for approximately 30 minutes.

Risks are minimal for involvement in this study. However, you may feel
emotionally uneasy when asked to make judgments based on your perception of
some safety issues affecting aviation safety at your organization. You may omit
questions that you feel uncomfortable to answer.

Your participation in this study is voluntary. Your may choose not to participate or
stop participating at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are
otherwise entitled. Your opinions and comments are confidential and will be
aggregated in the analysis.

If you will have any questions, comments, or concerns about this research
project, feel free to contact Dr. Fanjoy at rofanjoy@purdue.edu, 765 494 7764 or
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Mr. Walala at mwalala@purdue.edu. You may also contact Purdue’s Human
Research Protection Program at 767-494-5942, irb@purdue.edu, or write to:
Human Research Protection Program - Purdue University
Ernest C. Young Hall, Room 1032
155 S. Grant St.,
West Lafayette, IN 47907-2114
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Appendix B Intranet and Electronic Recruitment Statement

Safety Culture Study
Your opinion about the safety climate at “deleted” [subject airline] is important in
the continual improvement of safety in the aviation industry. My name is Micah
Walala, a graduate researcher working closely with Dr. Richard Fanjoy, a faculty
member at Purdue University in the School of Aviation and Transportation
Technology, invite you to participate in an anonymous survey about perceptions
of the safety culture at “deleted” [subject airline]. Understanding safety
perceptions will assist “deleted” [subject airline] in making continuous
improvements in safety to all aspects of its operations. You must be 18 years or
older to participate. The survey is voluntary. You may stop participating at any
time without consequence.
Since answers are to remain anonymous, PLEASE DO NOT PUT YOUR NAME
ON THIS SURVEY. Results will be reported for the group of respondents as a
whole to further ensure your anonymity. To further protect your identity, only the
investigators will have access to the survey data. “deleted” [subject airline] will be
furnished with the final report that will not contain any personal identifiable
information.
The survey will take approximately 10 minutes. Please answer questions to your
comfort level. To participate in the survey, click on the link below. Your consent is
implied by clicking on the link, and participating in the study.
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If you have any questions or concerns, feel free to contact Dr. Fanjoy at
rofanjoy@purdue.edu, 765 494 7764 or Mr. Walala at mwalala@purdue.edu, 765
714 9084
Again, we very much appreciate your assistance in this research effort.
<Insert Qualtrics link>
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Appendix C Focus Group Script

Hello and welcome to this focus group session intended to assess the safety climate at
“deleted” [subject airline]. My name is Micah Walala, a graduate researcher working
closely with Dr. Richard Fanjoy, a faculty member at Purdue University in the School of
Aviation and Transportation Technology. I will conduct the discussion and take notes.
Your opinion of safety climate at “deleted” [subject airline] is important to improving
aviation operational safety. I invited you all to share and discuss your perceptions of
safety at this organization. I will ask you several open questions. Your personal opinions
and view are very important to the study as well as to the continuous improvement of
safety in the aviation industry.
There are no right or wrong answers. Please feel welcome to express yourself freely
during the discussion. This conversation will be digitally audio recorded. The recording is
only for purpose of the research. Only Dr. Fanjoy and I will listen to the recording. Your
opinions and comments are confidential and will be aggregated in the analysis. No names
or personal information will be used in the report. However, due to the context of group
research, researchers cannot guarantee confidentiality as investigators cannot control
what individuals say outside the research context. Participation is also voluntary. You
may stop participating in the discussion at any time without consequence.
The discussion will last for about one hour. I ask you to please switch off your mobile
phones. Please give everyone the chance to express his or her opinion during the
conversation. You can address each other when expressing your opinion. I am only here
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to assist in the discussion. Is everything clear about the course of the focus group
discussion?
If you will have any questions or concerns later, feel free to contact me at
mwalala@purdue.edu, 765 714 9084or Dr. Fanjoy at rofanjoy@purdue.edu. 765 494
7764
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Appendix D Semi-Structured Interview Questions

Safety Culture and Safety Climate Semi-structured Interview
Questions.
You identify yourself as: Front-line employee__ Supervisor or Middlelevel manager__ Senior Manager__
1. How long have you been with “deleted” [subject airline] and what are your
roles and responsibilities?
2. What aspects of the “deleted”’s [subject airline] safety program are you
familiar with?
3. Do you have interaction with the “deleted” [subject airline] safety
personnel?
4.
a. How is safety emphasized in your work area with the employees
you supervise? (for managers only)
b. How is safety emphasized in your work area? (for front line
employees only)
5.
a. Is information about “deleted”’s [subject airline] safety programs
available to you and if so, how is it disseminated to your employees?
(for managers only)
b. Is information on the “deleted” [subject airline] safety programs
available to your front-line employees and if so, how is it
disseminated to them. (for front line employees only)
6. On a scale of 1 to 5, 5 being the highest, what is your general opinion of
the safety climate at this organization?
7. What areas of the organization do you feel are the strongest from a safety
standpoint?
8. What areas of the organization do you feel need to further emphasize
safety?
9. What are your recommendations, if any, for improving safety at “deleted”
[subject airline]?
10. Do you have any further comments or recommendations?
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Appendix E Study Consent Form
For IRB Use Only

RESEARCH PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM
Perception of Safety Culture at a Regional Airline
Dr. Richard Fanjoy - Principal Investigator
Mr. Micah Walala – Co-investigator
School of Aviation and Transportation Technology
Purdue University

“deleted” [subject airline] values, and is interested in your opinion concerning its
safety culture. The purpose of this study is to attempt to assess the perception of
front line operational personnel such as pilots, dispatch, and maintenance
personnel, as well as management’s opinion of the status of the safety culture at
“deleted” [subject airline]. Understanding safety perceptions will assist “deleted”
[subject airline] in making continuous improvements in safety to all aspects of its
operations. My name is Micah Walala, a student from Purdue University in the
School of Aviation and Transportation Technology, working closely with Dr.
Richard Fanjoy, the Principal Investigator. You are eligible to participate in this
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study because you are an employee of “deleted” [subject airline] or its affiliate,
and are at least 18 years old.

If you decide to participate in this study, you will take part in one, two, or three of
the following study phases: survey, interview, and focus group activities. The
questions in all three phases are designed to determine how you perceive the
safety culture in your organization.

Survey: - You are asked to answer a short questionnaire of 20 questions with five
point Likert-scale about your perception of aviation safety culture in your
organization. The survey includes one open-ended essay style question. The
survey will take approximately 10 minutes, and will be conducted on-line with a
title ‘Safety Culture Survey’. The survey also asks you to identify some of your
demographic information such as age and length of time you have worked at
your current position.

Interview: - You are asked a set of questions about your perception of safety
culture in your organization. The interview is designed to last for approximately
30 minutes. With your permission, the interview will be audio recorded. The
recording is only for purpose of the research. Only Dr. Fanjoy and I will listen to
the recording.
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Focus group activity: - A set of questions and topic will be introduced for your
opinion and discussion. With your permission, the session will be audio recorded.
The recording is only for purpose of the research. Only Dr. Fanjoy and I will listen
to the recording. The focus group session will last for approximately 30 minutes.

Risks are minimal for involvement in this study. However, you may feel
emotionally uneasy when asked to make judgments based on your perception of
some safety issues affecting aviation safety at your organization. You may omit
questions that you feel uncomfortable to answer. Although we do not expect any
harm to come upon any participants due to electronic malfunction of the
computer during the survey session, it is possible though extremely rare and
uncommon

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. Your may choose not to
participate or stop participating at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to
which you are otherwise entitled. Your opinions and comments are confidential
and will be aggregated in the analysis.

If you will have any questions, comments, or concerns about this research
project, feel free to contact Dr. Fanjoy at rofanjoy@purdue.edu, 765 494 7764 or
Mr. Walala at mwalala@purdue.edu. You may also contact Purdue’s Human
Research Protection Program at 767-494-5942, irb@purdue.edu, or write to:
Human Research Protection Program - Purdue University
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Ernest C. Young Hall, Room 1032
155 S. Grant St.,
West Lafayette, IN 47907-2114
Documentation of Informed Consent
I have had the opportunity to read this consent form and have the research study
explained. I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the research study,
and my questions have been answered. I am prepared to participate in the
research study described above. I will be offered a copy of this consent form after
I sign it.
__________________________________________
_________________________
Participant’s Signature
Date
__________________________________________
Participant’s Name
__________________________________________
___________________________
Researcher’s Signature
Date
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Appendix F Focus Group Questions
Assessment of Safety Culture Perceptions at a Regional Airline
Focus Group Questions/Script
INTRODUCTION
Thank you for taking time out of your valuable schedule to participate in this
focus group session. My name is Micah Walala. I’m a graduate student from
Purdue University. I am working on my dissertation research, in which I am trying
to assess perceptions of the safety climate and safety culture at “deleted”
[subject company]. This is the last of a three-segment study. I have gathered and
analyzed responses from online surveys and interviews. This meeting is about
generating a discussion to educate my perceptions gathered so far from the two
completed stages of the study. Please feel free to share your views and opinions.
GENERAL PERCEPTION OF WORK ENVIRONMENT
First, I would like to know a little more about your work areas.
1. To get started, what do you find most challenging about your work, and how do
those challenges influence safety culture?
SAFETY REPORTING AND JUST CULTURE
Safety reporting; the aviation industry is increasingly relying on incident reporting
to improve aviation safety.
2. What do you consider as the most effective safety programs, and why?
3. Data appears to indicate safety reporting has been steady among pilots,
increasingly picking up among flight attendants, and still very low among
maintenance technicians? What do you think accounts for these differences?
FEEDBACK
Feedback from incidents can be very helpful in preventing future accidents
4. Opinions regarding receiving feedback from incidents from programs such as
ASAP, Incident Reporting, Safety hotline, and Ghost rider programs varied
greatly among participants. Why do you think that is the case?
LEARNING CULTURE
A learning culture organization is characterized by two elements, an
organization’s ability to lean about its safety concerns, and its ability to implement
necessary changes.
5. There seemed to be extreme conflicting views regarding the company’s
commitment to implant safety changes, what have been your personal
experiences?
MANAGEMENT‘S ROLE IS SAFETY
Now, let us discuss management’s role in safety.
6. Responses from participants suggest that senior managers are largely out of
touch from front-line employees and the safety department. If so, what safety
implications are of concern?
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7. How would you describe the relationship between management and front-line
employees?
CRM
Let us talk about organizations. The nature of relationships between departments
in an organization can influence prevailing safety standing.
8. How would you describe the relationship between employees of the various
divisions in the company, and the impact of those relationships to safety?
Fatigue Management Program
The fatigue management program is intended to improve operational safety.
9. What are some of the challenges of the fatigue management program and how
are both pilots and management coping with these challenges?
SUMMARY & CLOSING
All right, just three more questions.
10. What are the things you are most proud regarding safety culture at “deleted”
[subject airline]?
11. What keeps you awake at night, in regard to safety?
12. Are there any other general comments regarding safety that you would like to
share?
Thank you all for your time and for sharing valuable information. This is the last of
a 3-segment study intended to assess the safety climate and safety culture at
“deleted” [subject airline]. The final aggregated result will be available to the
company for further safety considerations.

.
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Appendix G Research Exempt Request Application
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Appendix H Institutional Review Board Approval for the Study
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Ph.D. Technology - Aviation Concentration
Purdue University – West Lafayette, Indiana. May 2016

M.S. Safety Science. Concentrations - Aviation Safety; Industrial
technology; and Systems safety and reliability.
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Prescott, AZ. May 2008

B.S. Aerospace Studies. Minors – Aeronautical science, Computer
applications, Business Administration. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University, Prescott, AZ. May 2006
Academic Honors
Purdue Research Foundation Grant, 2015 - 2016
Julie Swengel Diversity Scholarship, 2015 - 2016
Third place, Virtual poster award, University Aviation Association
conference, Fall, 2015
Outstanding Graduate, Embry Riddle Aeronautical University –
Department of Behavior and Safety Sciences 2007, 2008
American Society of Safety Engineers Gold Country Section & Region
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187
Research Experience
Perception of safety in U.S collegiate aviation, 2015
Aviation biofuel from corn stover, spring 2015
Manpower scheduling of baggage and cargo handlers, 2014
Teaching and Professional Experiences
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2010-2013
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